Limited liability company | EPFL Graph Search

A limited liability company (LLC for short) is the United States-specific form of a private limited company. It is a business structure that can combine the pass-through taxation of a partnership or sole proprietorship with the limited liability of a corporation. An LLC is not a corporation under state law; it is a legal form of a company that provides limited liability to its owners in many jurisdictions. LLCs are well known for the flexibility that they provide to business owners; depending on the situation, an LLC may elect to use corporate tax rules instead of being treated as a partnership, and, under certain circumstances, LLCs may be organized as not-for-profit. In certain U.S. states (for example, Texas), businesses that provide professional services requiring a state professional license, such as legal or medical services, may not be allowed to form an LLC but may be required to form a similar entity called a professional limited liability company (PLLC). An LLC is a hybrid legal entity having certain characteristics of both a corporation and a partnership or sole proprietorship (depending on how many owners there are). An LLC is a type of unincorporated association distinct from a corporation. The primary characteristic an LLC shares with a corporation is limited liability, and the primary characteristic it shares with a partnership is the availability of pass-through income taxation. As a business entity, an LLC is often more flexible than a corporation and may be well-suited for companies with a single owner. Although LLCs and corporations both possess some analogous features, the basic terminology commonly associated with each type of legal entity, at least within the United States, is sometimes different. When an LLC is formed, it is said to be "organized", not "incorporated" or "chartered", and its founding document is likewise known as its "articles of organization", instead of its "articles of incorporation" or its "corporate charter". Internal operations of an LLC are further governed by its "operating agreement", a "member", rather than a "shareholder.

Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance

Francesca Maria Zucchi

This thesis examines the effects of financing frictions on corporate decisions using dynamic models. Accounting for financing frictions helps reconcile a number of regularities that are hard to explain within the Modigliani-Miller framework. For instance, financing frictions provide incentives for firms to keep liquidity on their balance sheets as a precautionary hedge---a pattern that has been heavily debated in light of the secular increase of cash-to-asset ratios of U.S. firms. The first chapter develops a model that investigates the relation between corporate policies and secondary stock market liquidity. I show that secondary market illiquidity limits a firm's ability to hold precautionary liquidity, exacerbates financial constraints, reduces investment, and decreases firm value. The model reproduces the positive relation between market liquidity and corporate cash holdings observed in the data. This relation might be surprising since firms with illiquid stocks, which have been documented to be more financially constrained than more liquid peers, should be willing to keep more precautionary cash. I also show that the illiquidity-driven drop in firm value can feed back into the secondary market by deterring the participation of liquidity providers, thereby making the market more illiquid. The self-reinforcing nature of this relation gives rise to an internal-external liquidity loop, which singles out a propagation mechanism between financial markets and the corporate sector. From a banking perspective, liquidity hoarding has been a hotly debated topic among academics and policy-makers in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The second chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Erwan Morellec and Marco Della Seta, develops a dynamic model of the effects of liability structure and liquid reserves on banks' insolvency risk. When a bank relies on short-term debt financing, negative operating shocks get amplified as the bank weaker fundamentals also translate into losses when rolling over short-term debt. This amplification mechanism leads to an increase in default risk that gets more pronounced as debt maturity decreases and rollover losses increase. Because of this amplification mechanism, banks with identical debt ratios and liquid reserves but different debt structures have different default risk. Heavy exposure to rollover risk can also lead banks to implement gambling strategies when close to default. The third chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Semyon Malamud, analyzes firms' optimal policies in a general equilibrium setting. It characterizes optimal liquidity management, innovation, and production decisions for a continuum of firms facing financing frictions and the threat of creative destruction. We show that liquidity constraints lead firms to cut production and increase markups, which are then countercyclical with respect to firm-specific shocks. We also illustrate that liquidity constraints may spur firms' investment in innovation and give rise to a non-monotonic cash-investment relation. We embed our single-firm dynamics in a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth and demonstrate that financing frictions have a non-monotonic effect on economic growth and may increase aggregate consumption. When the corporate sector is constrained, liquidity injections by the government have real effects and can stimulate growth.

EPFL2015

Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance

Francesca Maria Zucchi

EPFL2015