Concept
Justification (epistemology)
Related concepts (28)
Basic belief
Basic beliefs (also commonly called foundational beliefs or core beliefs) are, under the epistemological view called foundationalism, the axioms of a belief system. Foundationalism holds that all beliefs must be justified in order to be known.
Evidentialism
Evidentialism is a thesis in epistemology which states that one is justified to believe something if and only if that person has evidence which supports said belief. Evidentialism is, therefore, a thesis about which beliefs are justified and which are not. For philosophers Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, evidentialism is the strongest argument for justification because it identifies the primary notion of epistemic justification. They argue that if a person's attitude towards a proposition fits their evidence, then their doxastic attitude for that proposition is epistemically justified.
Agrippa the Skeptic
Agrippa (Ἀγρίππας) was a Pyrrhonist philosopher who probably lived towards the end of the 1st century CE. He is regarded as the author of "The Five Tropes (or Modes, in τρόποι) of Agrippa", which are purported to establish the necessity of suspending judgment (epoché). Agrippa's arguments form the basis of the Agrippan trilemma. Sextus Empiricus described these "modes" or "tropes" in Outlines of Pyrrhonism, attributing them "to the more recent skeptics"; Diogenes Laërtius attributes them to Agrippa.
Dream argument
The dream argument is the postulation that the act of dreaming provides preliminary evidence that the senses we trust to distinguish reality from illusion should not be fully trusted, and therefore, any state that is dependent on our senses should at the very least be carefully examined and rigorously tested to determine whether it is in fact reality. While dreaming, one does not normally realize one is dreaming. On more rare occasions, the dream may be contained inside another dream with the very act of realizing that one is dreaming, itself, being only a dream that one is not aware of having.
Foundherentism
In epistemology, foundherentism is a theory of justification that combines elements from the two rival theories addressing infinite regress, foundationalism prone to arbitrariness, and coherentism prone to circularity (problems raised by the Münchhausen trilemma). Foundherentism was developed and defended by Susan Haack in Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (1993).
Cartesian doubt
Cartesian doubt is a form of methodological skepticism associated with the writings and methodology of René Descartes (March 31, 1596Feb 11, 1650). Cartesian doubt is also known as Cartesian skepticism, methodic doubt, methodological skepticism, universal doubt, systematic doubt, or hyperbolic doubt. Cartesian doubt is a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs, which has become a characteristic method in philosophy.
Defeater
A defeater of a belief is evidence that this belief is false. Defeaters are of particular interest to epistemology because they affect whether a belief is justified. An important distinction is between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. Undercutting defeaters remove evidential support for a belief while rebutting defeaters provide evidential support for the opposite thesis of the belief. Defeaters play a central role in modern developments of defeasible reasoning.
Declarative knowledge
Declarative knowledge is an awareness of facts that can be expressed using declarative sentences, like knowing that Princess Diana died in 1997. It is also called theoretical knowledge, descriptive knowledge, propositional knowledge, and knowledge-that. It is not restricted to one specific use or purpose and can be stored in books or on computers. Epistemology is the main discipline studying declarative knowledge. Among other things, it studies the essential components of declarative knowledge.