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Concept
Scorporo
Summary
Scorporo (ˈskɔrporo, parceling out) is a partially compensatory, mixed-member majoritarian electoral system, sometimes referred to as a negative vote transfer system (NVT) whereby a portion of members are elected in single-member districts (SMDs) and a portion are elected from a list. It may be fully defined as a parallel voting system which excludes a portion (up to 100%) of the SMD winners' votes in electing the proportional tier, to result in a more proportional outcome. The exclusion of a portion of the SMD winners' votes is what makes scorporo fundamentally different from parallel voting and somewhat closer to mixed member proportional representation, and thereby between the two in terms of proportionality. The system is only known to have been used in Italy and for a portion of the compensatory tier of the National Assembly of Hungary.
Scorporo was in force for elections to the bicameral Parliament of Italy based on Law 277/1993 from 1993 to 2005. Under this system, members could be elected in two ways:
75% of elected members were elected in single member districts (SMDs) using first-past-the-post voting.
25% of elected members were elected on list basis based on the proportion of the votes received by the party (using the D'Hondt method), with the exclusion of a proportion of any first-placed winner's votes.
The system was subject to the following specific rules for each chamber:
List seats were calculated at the regional level.
All votes for winning candidates were excluded from the list allocation.
No threshold was applied for list seats.
The SMD vote and the list vote were linked, limiting the use of decoy lists (see below).
The list seats were calculated at the national level.
The number of SMD winner's votes excluded from the list vote was equal to the second place candidate's vote total +1. This represented the number of votes needed to elect the winner in the SMD.
A 4% threshold was established for parties to qualify for the list seats.
The local vote and list vote were not tied to each other, thereby providing an incentive for decoy lists (see below).
Official source
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