Two envelopes problemThe two envelopes problem, also known as the exchange paradox, is a paradox in probability theory. It is of special interest in decision theory and for the Bayesian interpretation of probability theory. It is a variant of an older problem known as the necktie paradox. The problem is typically introduced by formulating a hypothetical challenge like the following example: Imagine you are given two identical envelopes, each containing money. One contains twice as much as the other.
Boy or Girl paradoxThe Boy or Girl paradox surrounds a set of questions in probability theory, which are also known as The Two Child Problem, Mr. Smith's Children and the Mrs. Smith Problem. The initial formulation of the question dates back to at least 1959, when Martin Gardner featured it in his October 1959 "Mathematical Games column" in Scientific American. He titled it The Two Children Problem, and phrased the paradox as follows: Mr. Jones has two children. The older child is a girl. What is the probability that both children are girls? Mr.
Sleeping Beauty problemThe Sleeping Beauty problem is a puzzle in decision theory in which whenever an ideally rational epistemic agent is awoken from sleep, they have no memory of whether they have been awoken before. Upon being told that they have been woken once or twice according to the toss of a coin, once if heads and twice if tails, they are asked their degree of belief for the coin having come up heads. The problem was originally formulated in unpublished work in the mid-1980s by Arnold Zuboff (the work was later published as "One Self: The Logic of Experience") followed by a paper by Adam Elga.
Expected utility hypothesisThe expected utility hypothesis is a popular concept in economics that serves as a reference guide for decision making when the payoff is uncertain. The theory describes which options rational individuals should choose in a situation with uncertainty, based on their risk aversion. The expected utility hypothesis states an agent chooses between risky prospects by comparing expected utility values (i.e. the weighted sum of adding the respective utility values of payoffs multiplied by their probabilities).
Bayes' theoremIn probability theory and statistics, Bayes' theorem (beɪz or beɪzɪz ; alternatively Bayes' law or Bayes' rule), and occasionally Bayes's theorem, named after Thomas Bayes, describes the probability of an event, based on prior knowledge of conditions that might be related to the event. For example, if the risk of developing health problems is known to increase with age, Bayes' theorem allows the risk to an individual of a known age to be assessed more accurately by conditioning it relative to their age, rather than simply assuming that the individual is typical of the population as a whole.
Decision theoryDecision theory (or the theory of choice; not to be confused with choice theory) is a branch of applied probability theory and analytic philosophy concerned with the theory of making decisions based on assigning probabilities to various factors and assigning numerical consequences to the outcome. There are three branches of decision theory: Normative decision theory: Concerned with the identification of optimal decisions, where optimality is often determined by considering an ideal decision-maker who is able to calculate with perfect accuracy and is in some sense fully rational.
Bayesian probabilityBayesian probability (ˈbeɪziən or ˈbeɪʒən ) is an interpretation of the concept of probability, in which, instead of frequency or propensity of some phenomenon, probability is interpreted as reasonable expectation representing a state of knowledge or as quantification of a personal belief. The Bayesian interpretation of probability can be seen as an extension of propositional logic that enables reasoning with hypotheses; that is, with propositions whose truth or falsity is unknown.
