Equity (finance) | EPFL Graph Search

In finance, equity is an ownership interest in property that may be offset by debts or other liabilities. Equity is measured for accounting purposes by subtracting liabilities from the value of the assets owned. For example, if someone owns a car worth

24,000 and owes

10,000 on the loan used to buy the car, the difference of $14,000 is equity. Equity can apply to a single asset, such as a car or house, or to an entire business. A business that needs to start up or expand its operations can sell its equity in order to raise cash that does not have to be repaid on a set schedule. When liabilities attached to an asset exceed its value, the difference is called a deficit and the asset is informally said to be "underwater" or "upside-down". In government finance or other non-profit settings, equity is known as "net position" or "net assets". Origins The term "equity" describes this type of ownership in English because it was regulated through the system of equity law that deve

24,000 and owes

Essays in Bank Financing

Yalda Sigrist

This thesis examines the optimal mode of financing for banks and financial institutions. The first chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Jean-Charles Rochet, investigates how Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) should be financed. The main specificity of such firms is that their failure imposes negative externalities on the financial system and, more broadly, on the whole economy. Since their shareholders do not internalize these externalities, they tend to provide less capital than what would be socially optimal, generating too many failures. In jurisdictions where they receive tax exemptions, CoCo bonds are a simple means of increasing the resilience of SIFIs while providing large tax benefits to banks' shareholders. However, we show that when tax revenues are properly accounted for, these CoCo bonds are detrimental to social welfare. The second chapter provides a formal model of a bail-in plan, a pre-defined contract that results in self-recapitalization of a financial institution when it is in distress and has no access to equity financing. Bail-ins have the potential to eliminate inefficient bank liquidations and ease financing constraints in bad times. Using a theoretical model of a bail-in contract where banks face time varying financing frictions, taxation and liquidation costs, I show that banks' capital structure decisions and optimal financing and pay-out policies are largely affected by the design of the contingent capital (specifically the conversion ratio). However independent of its design, for an optimal level of debt, bail-in contracts always decrease shareholders incentives to build up liquid buffers and to recapitalize in good times but also eliminate any risk-taking incentives. The third chapter presents a model of bank optimal maturity structure when banks face systemic risk through correlated investments. Banks can privately affect the probability of success of their projects. Risky short-term debt can act as a disciplinary device if it is not rolled over when an adverse interim-date signal on the quality of banks' assets is received. The optimal maturity structure is the result of the trade-off between the disciplinary benefits of short-term debt and the costs of inefficient early liquidations. I show that bank asset commonality affects this trade-off since it reduces the costs of exerting effort through positive information synergies and increases the inefficiency of early liquidations through negative fire-sale externalities. In particular, there is a more important role for the disciplinary effects of short-term debt in high correlation, high fire-sale externalities and low information synergies environments.

EPFL2017

Three Essays in Banking and Finance

Damien Olivier Klossner

This thesis develops three models that study the motivation of various agents to take on debt, and the impact that excessive financial leverage can have on social welfare. In the chapter "Short-term Bank Leverage and the Value of Liquid Reserves", the incentive of a bank to take on leverage stems from the fact that its short-term debt provides liquidity benefits to depositors, at the cost of exposing the bank to the risk of runs. In the model, a bank possesses two instruments to manage the risk of runs: its funding policy and the size of its liquid asset holdings, modeled as government bonds. Issuing more debt allows the bank to better capture the liquidity benefits fits priced into deposits but increases illiquidity risk. Holding more bonds makes the bank more robust to withdrawals but it reduces the bank's asset returns. When the supply is scarce, banks are the natural buyers of government bonds. This links the liquidity premium priced into government bonds to the risk of bank runs. In the chapter "Liquidity, Debt Overhang, and Monetary Policy", firms take on bank credit to relax their liquidity constraint and purchase new capital. But taking on debt creates a debt overhang distortion which causes entrepreneurs to pass on protable projects. In the model, entrepreneurs arrange for their financing before they observe the profitability of their investment opportunity. After the latter becomes known, entrepreneurs are liquidity-constrained when investment conditions are favorable, and over-indebted when they are unfavorable. The monetary authority can generate welfare gains by lowering the cost of holding liquidity and, when debt is contracted in nominal terms, by pursuing a counter-cyclical monetary policy. In the chapter "Safe Claim Production and Capital Structure", firms issue debt to satisfy the demand of risk-averse investors for safe claims, at the cost of increasing default risk. In general equilibrium, firms need to be compensated for this service, which can only occur if their debt and equity claims are held and priced by different investor types. This segmentation of the investor base can be sufficient to prevent the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. Instead, only a fraction of firms opt for levered capital structures, and the gain in value obtained by tranching cash flows into debt and equity is offset by the expected cost of default. Changes in aggregate leverage can be divided into variations in extensive (the fraction of levered firms ) and intensive (the leverage ratio of levered firms ) margins. Changes in rm business risk have opposite effects on leverage, depending on whether the risk is of a systematic nature or firm-specific nature.

EPFL2019

Pricing interest rate, dividend, and equity risk

Sander Félix M Willems

This thesis studies the valuation and hedging of financial derivatives, which is fundamental for trading and risk-management operations in financial institutions. The three chapters in this thesis deal with derivatives whose payoffs are linked to interest rates, equity prices, and dividend payments. The first chapter introduces a flexible framework based on polynomial jump-diffusions (PJD) to jointly price the term structures of dividends and interest rates. Prices for dividend futures, bonds, and the dividend paying stock are given in closed form. Option prices are approximated efficiently using a moment matching technique based on the principle of maximum entropy. An extensive calibration exercise shows that a parsimonious model specification has a good fit with Euribor interest rate swaps and swaptions, Euro Stoxx 50 index dividend futures and dividend options, and Euro Stoxx 50 index options. The second chapter revisits the problem of pricing a continuously sampled arithmetic Asian option in the classical Black-Scholes setting. An identity in law links the integrated stock price to a one-dimensional polynomial diffusion, a particular instance of the PJD encountered in the first chapter. The Asian option price is approximated by a series expansion based on polynomials that are orthogonal with respect to the log-normal distribution. All terms in the series are fully explicit and no numerical integration nor any special functions are involved. The moment indeterminacy of the log-normal distribution introduces an asymptotic bias in the series, however numerical experiments show that the bias can safely be ignored in practice. The last chapter presents a non-parametric method to construct a maximally smooth discount curve from observed market prices of linear interest rate products such as swaps, forward rate agreements, or coupon bonds. The discount curve is given in closed form and only requires basic linear algebra operations. The method is illustrated with several practical examples.

EPFL2019