Concept
Monotonicity of entailment
Related concepts (4)
Idempotency of entailment
Idempotency of entailment is a property of logical systems that states that one may derive the same consequences from many instances of a hypothesis as from just one. This property can be captured by a structural rule called contraction, and in such systems one may say that entailment is idempotent if and only if contraction is an admissible rule. Rule of contraction: from A,C,C → B is derived A,C → B. Or in sequent calculus notation, In linear and affine logic, entailment is not idempotent.
Linear logic
Linear logic is a substructural logic proposed by Jean-Yves Girard as a refinement of classical and intuitionistic logic, joining the dualities of the former with many of the constructive properties of the latter. Although the logic has also been studied for its own sake, more broadly, ideas from linear logic have been influential in fields such as programming languages, game semantics, and quantum physics (because linear logic can be seen as the logic of quantum information theory), as well as linguistics, particularly because of its emphasis on resource-boundedness, duality, and interaction.
Natural deduction
In logic and proof theory, natural deduction is a kind of proof calculus in which logical reasoning is expressed by inference rules closely related to the "natural" way of reasoning. This contrasts with Hilbert-style systems, which instead use axioms as much as possible to express the logical laws of deductive reasoning. Natural deduction grew out of a context of dissatisfaction with the axiomatizations of deductive reasoning common to the systems of Hilbert, Frege, and Russell (see, e.g., Hilbert system).
Sequent calculus
In mathematical logic, sequent calculus is a style of formal logical argumentation in which every line of a proof is a conditional tautology (called a sequent by Gerhard Gentzen) instead of an unconditional tautology. Each conditional tautology is inferred from other conditional tautologies on earlier lines in a formal argument according to rules and procedures of inference, giving a better approximation to the natural style of deduction used by mathematicians than to David Hilbert's earlier style of formal logic, in which every line was an unconditional tautology.