Government debt

Summary

A country's gross government debt (also called public debt, or sovereign debt) is the financial liabilities of the government sector. Changes in government debt over time reflect primarily borrowing due to past government deficits. A deficit occurs when a government's expenditures exceed revenues. Government debt may be owed to domestic residents, as well as to foreign residents. If owed to foreign residents, that quantity is included in the country's external debt. In 2020, the value of government debt worldwide was $87.4 US trillion, or 99% measured as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). Government debt accounted for almost 40% of all debt (which includes corporate and household debt), the highest share since the 1960s. The rise in government debt since 2007 is largely attributable to the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The ability of government to issue debt

Official source

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt

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Essays in Corporate Finance

Thomas Antonius Geelen

In this thesis I study how firms choose their optimal debt maturity. The recent financial crisis illustrated why debt maturity is an important determinant of firmsâ capital structure and it also renewed economistsâ interest in this topic, see for example Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), He and Milbradt (2016), Ju and Ou-Yang (2006), Crouzet (2016), and Huang et al. (2017). This thesis exists of two chapters. In the first chapter, titled âInformation Dynamics and Debt Maturityâ, I develop a dynamic model of financing decisions and optimal debt maturity choice in which creditors face adverse selection and learn about the firmâs quality from news. In equilibrium, shareholders may choose to postpone debt issuance to reduce adverse selection and improve the pricing of newly issued debt. Over time, the benefits of learning decrease and zero-leverage firms eventually decide to issue debt. Because shorter maturity debt is less sensitive to information, younger firms issue shorter maturity debt to alleviate adverse selection while mature firms issue longer maturity debt, leading to a life-cycle theory of debt maturity. In the second chapter, titled âDebt Maturity and Lumpy Debtâ, I develop a dynamic capital structure model in which shareholders determine a firmâs leverage ratio, debt maturity, and default strategy. In my model, the firmâs debt matures all at once. Therefore, after repaying the principal shareholders own all the firmâs cash flows and can pick a new capital structure. The possibility to alter the capital structure at maturity gives shareholders the incentive to issue finite maturity debt and allows me to study firmsâ joint choice of leverage and debt maturity. I also extend my model by allowing for time-varying capital supply to study time-variation in firmsâ joint choice of leverage and debt maturity.

EPFL2018

Investment-based financing constraints and debt renegotiation

Michi Nishihara

We consider how equity holders' bargaining power during financial distress influences the interactions between financing and investment decisions when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We obtain four results. First, weaker equity holders' bargaining power is more likely that the firm is financially constrained. Second, the investment quantity is independent of equity holders' bargaining power. Third, the constrained credit spreads are increasing with equity holders' bargaining power, contrary to the unconstrained ones. Fourth, higher volatility and weaker equity holders' bargaining power are likely that the firm prefers to issue debt with renegotiation, compared with debt without renegotiation. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Elsevier Science Bv2015

The ability to issue debt that pays in units of the domestic good leads a country to accumulate a large and negative net foreign asset position while maintaining a positive position in equity. This debt market advantage also helps to explain the weak relationship between the real exchange rate and relative consumption. Our stylized model matches the key facts about the U.S. international portfolio, the U.S. real exchange rate, and explains nearly 50% of the observed variation in the valuation effects. We find that taxing bond market transactions increases the volatility of the exchange rate, capital flows and allocations. In contrast, taxing equity positions stabilizes the exchange rate and capital flows while having little impact on the allocation. Lastly, the paper describes a global solution method for portfolio problems under incomplete markets. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Elsevier Science Bv2015