Concept
Online auction
Related publications (26)
No-Regret Learning from Partially Observed Data in Repeated Auctions
Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca
We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online using no-regret algorithms based on the data obser ...
2020Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design
Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...
EPFL2020Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design
Daniel Kuhn, Cagil Kocyigit, Wolfram Wiesemann
We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for each of whom it has a private value that is unknown to the seller and the other bidders. The agents perceive the ensemble of all bidder values as a random v ...
2020A Truthful, Privacy-Preserving, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auction For Single-minded Bidders
Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar, Sankarshan Damle
Combinatorial auctions are widely used to sell resources/items. The challenges in such auctions are multi-fold. We need to ensure that bidders, the strategic agents, bid their valuations truthfully to the auction mechanism. Besides, the agents may desire p ...
ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2019Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods
Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot inf ...
2019