Publication

Selling Less Information for More: Garbling with Benefits

Thomas Alois Weber
2004
Journal paper

Abstract

The expected value of information in a standard portfolio investment problem with ex-post payment can increase when the information is garbled prior to its sale. Distorting the information helps to resolve the incentive problem decreasing the buyer’s default risk and thereby increasing the seller’s expected revenues.

Official source

https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/187526?ln=en

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Selling Less Information for More: Garbling with Benefits

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A contagion process with self-exciting jumps in credit risk applications

Essays in Banking and Financial Regulation

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Mean-Covariance Robust Risk Measurement

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A contagion process with self-exciting jumps in credit risk applications