Default (finance)

Summary

In finance, default is failure to meet the legal obligations (or conditions) of a loan, for example when a home buyer fails to make a mortgage payment, or when a corporation or government fails to pay a bond which has reached maturity. A national or sovereign default is the failure or refusal of a government to repay its national debt. The biggest private default in history is Lehman Brothers, with over

600 billion when it filed for bankruptcy in 2008 (equivalent to over

billion in ). The biggest sovereign default is Greece, with

138 billion in March 2012 (equivalent to

billion in ). Distinction from insolvency, illiquidity and bankruptcy The term "default" should be distinguished from the terms "insolvency", illiquidity and "bankruptcy":

Default: Debtors have been passed behind the payment deadline on a debt whose payment was due.
Illiquidity: Debtors have insufficient cash (or other "liquefiable" assets) to pay debts.
Insolvency: A legal term meanin

Official source

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Default_(finance)

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Essays in Banking and Financial Regulation

Susanne Johanna Petronella Léonie Vissers

This thesis examines how banks choose their optimal capital structure and cash reserves in the presence of regulatory measures. The first chapter, titled Bank Capital Structure and Tail Risk, presents a bank capital structure model in which bank assets are subject to both diffusion and tail risk. Of these two types of risk, tail risk causes uninsured deposits to be risky, as the bank's asset value can unexpectedly fall below the value of deposits in case of default. The model shows that tail risk, rather than diffusion risk, is the main driver of the risk on deposits when the bank is unregulated and of the endogenous deposit insurance premium when the bank is regulated. Keeping total volatility constant, the model shows that a high tail risk component leads to higher credit spreads, default risk, and magnitude of bank losses in default than a high diffusion risk component.The second chapter, titled Bank Regulation and Market Discipline in the Presence of Risk-Taking Incentives, presents a bank capital structure model in which equity holders can increase asset risk once debt is in place. I study the effects of capital requirements and subsidized deposit insurance on the bank's privately optimal funding and operational risk level. The model predicts that there are synergetic effects of regulation and market discipline. When the regulator sets the capital charge and deposit insurance premium payments sufficiently high for a risky portfolio, the bank commits to the low-risk asset portfolio by setting a lower leverage ratio and substituting market debt for deposits. This market discipline effect disappears when the regulatory costs become too high. In the third chapter that is titled Dividend Restrictions and Asymmetric Information, we develop a dynamic model of a bank whose management has superior information about the impact of a pending shock to the bank's cash holdings and can signal the bank's type through its dividend policy. Banks that will be adversely affected by the shock have incentives to pool with unaffected banks to increase their market value. To avoid being mimicked, the unaffected banks can credibly signal via a more aggressive payout strategy. Dividend payout restrictions have the potential to prevent a separating equilibrium from forming. This leads to the bad type adopting a more aggressive payout policy with a higher risk of default but mitigates the distortion of the good type's policy. We identify a number of scenarios where this trade-off presents an opportunity for regulatory intervention and some where it does not.

EPFL2021

We develop a finite horizon continuous time market model, where risk-averse investors maximize utility from terminal wealth by dynamically investing in a risk-free money market account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, whose prices are determined via equilibrium. We analyze the endogenous interaction arising between the stock and the defaultable bond via the interplay between equilibrium behavior of investors, risk preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We find that the equilibrium price of the stock experiences a jump at default, despite that the default event has no causal impact on the underlying economic fundamentals. We characterize the direction of the jump in terms of a relation between investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We conduct a similar analysis for the market price of risk and for the investor wealth process, and determine how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to default carried by different investors.

Wiley-Blackwell2015

Optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets

Semyon Malamud

We study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard. A financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets, whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermediary. We calculate the optimal contract for any given effort level and show the natural emergence of extreme punishment for defaults, under which investors stop paying the intermediary after the first default. With securitization contracts optimally designed, we find securitization improves the intermediary's screening incentives. Furthermore, the equilibrium effort level and the surplus converge to their first best levels with sufficiently many assets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Elsevier2013

Essays in Banking and Financial Regulation

Susanne Johanna Petronella Léonie Vissers

EPFL2021