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Accountable Anonymous Service Usage in Mobile Communication Systems

Related publications (33)

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Group Secret Key Generation over Broadcast Erasure Channels

Christina Fragouli, Suhas Diggavi, Mahdi Jafari Siavoshani, Uday Kiran Pulleti

We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K over a wireless channel in the presence an eavesdropper Eve. We assume an erasure broadcast channel from one of the honest nodes to the rest of them including Eve. All of the t ...

2010

Secure communication using authenticated channels

Sylvain Pasini

Our main motivation is to design more user-friendly security protocols. Indeed, if the use of the protocol is tedious, most users will not behave correctly and, consequently, security issues occur. An example is the actual behavior of a user in front of an ...

EPFL2009

Secure Communication using an Untrusted Relay via Sources and Channels

Michael Christoph Gastpar

Confidential communication aided by a relay without security clearance is studied. General strategies and outer bounds are derived for the problem of secret communication and secret key generation when correlated observations at all terminals are available ...

Ieee Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Po Box 1331, Piscataway, Nj 08855-1331 Usa2009

Information-theoretic secrecy for wireless networks

Etienne Perron

The aim of information-theoretic secrecy is to ensure that an eavesdropper who listens to the wireless transmission of a message can only collect an arbitrarily small number of information bits about this message. In contrast to cryptography, there are no ...

EPFL2009

Cryptanalysis of e-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy

Recently, two e-mail protocols were proposed claiming to provide perfect secrecy. These protocols use authentication and (Diffie-Hellman) key-exchange techniques, and as such, other standard security criteria besides perfect forward secrecy include key-rep ...

2008

Consensus and collision detectors in radio networks

Seth Gilbert

We consider the fault-tolerant consensus problem in radio networks with crash-prone nodes. Specifically, we develop lower bounds and matching upper bounds for this problem in single-hop radios networks, where all nodes are located within broadcast range of ...

2008

Chain-Based Anonymous Routing for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

Reza Shokri

Wireless ad hoc networks are so vulnerable to passive attacks and eavesdropping adversaries due to their shared medium which makes network traffic easy to capture and analyze. Therefore, security and privacy protections are of extreme importance for protoc ...

IEEE2007

Key Agreement in Peer-to-Peer Wireless Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Mario Cagalj, Srdan Capkun

We present a set of simple techniques for key establishment over a radio link in peer-to-peer networks. Our approach is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, which is known to be vulnerable to the ``man-in-the-middle" attack if the two users ...

2006

On Bluetooth repairing: key agreement based on symmetric-key cryptography

Serge Vaudenay

Despite many good (secure) key agreement protocols based on public-key cryptography exist, secure associations between two wireless devices are often established using symmetric-key cryptography for cost reasons. The consequence is that common daily used s ...

2005

What Can Be Implemented Anonymously?

Rachid Guerraoui, Eric Ruppert

Abstract. The vast majority of papers on distributed computing assume that processes are assigned unique identifiers before computation begins. But is this assumption necessary? What if processes do not have unique identifiers or do not wish to divulge the ...

2005