Game theoretic analysis of electricity market auction mechanisms
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We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mechanism for selling multiple items to multiple anonymous bidders with additive values. The seller knows that the bidders' values range over a box uncertainty ...
We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the markets and lin ...
This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classifier. While previous works usually al ...
In this paper we provide a novel and simple algorithm, Clairvoyant Multiplicative Weights Updates (CMWU), for convergence to \textit{Coarse Correlated Equilibria} (CCE) in general games. CMWU effectively corresponds to the standard MWU algorithm but where ...
We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online using no-regret algorithms based on the data obser ...
The aggregators are intermediary players at the distribution system level. They manage the financial transactions of resources such as micro-turbines (MTs), photo-voltaic (PV) production systems, flexible demands (FDs), and must-run demands (MDs) in the en ...
Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...
The establishment of a single European day-ahead market has accomplished the integration of the regional day-ahead markets. However, the reserves provision and activation remain an exclusive responsibility of regional operators. This limited spatial coordi ...
The establishment of a single European day-ahead market has accomplished the integration of the regional day-ahead markets. However, reserve provision and activation remain an exclusive responsibility of regional operators. This limited spatial coordinatio ...
We address online bandit learning of Nash equilibria in multi-agent convex games. We propose an algorithm whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at each joint played action, lacking any information of the functional form of her c ...