KeY (logiciel)

Résumé

vignette|Capture d'écran du logiciel KeY Le logiciel KeY est un outil de vérification formelle de programmes Java. Débuté en , le projet KeY est porté par l'Institut de technologie de Karlsruhe, l'Université de technologie de Darmstadt et l'École polytechnique Chalmers. KeY accepte les spécifications écrites à l'aide du Java Modeling Language (JML). Notes et références Annexes Liens externes

KeY Project

Catégorie:Méthode formelle Catégorie:Java (langage)

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/KeY_(logiciel)

À propos de ce résultat

Cette page est générée automatiquement et peut contenir des informations qui ne sont pas correctes, complètes, à jour ou pertinentes par rapport à votre recherche. Il en va de même pour toutes les autres pages de ce site. Veillez à vérifier les informations auprès des sources officielles de l'EPFL.

Publications associées (16)

Publications associées

Chargement

Personnes associées (2)

Personnes associées

Chargement

Unités associées (2)

Unités associées

Chargement

Concepts associés

Chargement

Cours associés (45)

Cours associés

Chargement

Séances de cours associées (125)

Séances de cours associées

Chargement

Supporting Loop Proofs in KeY by using BLAST

Mathias Krebs

In contrast to beta-testing, formal verification can guarantee correctness of a program against a specification. Two basic verification techniques are theorem proving and model checking. Both have strengths and weaknesses. Theorem proving is powerful, but difficult to use for a software engineer. Model checking is fully automatic, but less powerful and hard to extend. This paper shows a possibility, how to combine both approaches, in order to surround the weaknesses. Concretely, we automatize the proof of while loops in the theorem prover KeY, by using the model checker BLAST.

2006

Chargement

Cryptographic primitives are the basic components of any cryptographic tool. Block ciphers, stream ciphers and hash functions are the fundamental primitives of symmetric cryptography. In symmetric cryptography, the communicating parties perform essentially the same operation and use the same key, if any. This thesis concerns cryptanalysis of stream ciphers and hash functions. The main contribution of this work is introducing the concept of probabilistic neutrality for the arguments of a function, a generalization of the definition of neutrality. An input argument of a given function is called neutral if it does not affect the output of the function. This simple idea has already been implicitly used in key recovery cryptanalysis of block ciphers and stream ciphers. However, in 2004, Biham and Chen explicitly used the idea of neutrality to speed up collision finding algorithms for hash functions. We call an input argument of a function probabilistic neutral if it does not have a "significant" influence on the output of the function. Simply stated, it means that if the input argument is changed, the output of the function stays the same with a probability "close" to one. We will exploit the idea of probabilistic neutrality to assess the security of several stream ciphers and hash functions. Interestingly, all our cryptanalyses rely on neutrality and/or probabilistic neutrality. In other words, these concepts will appear as a common ingredient in all of our cryptanalytic algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the probabilistic neutrality has found diverse applications in cryptanalysis.

EPFL2010

Chargement

New Directions in Cryptanalysis of Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers

Shahram Khazaei, Willi Meier

In cryptology we commonly face the problem of finding an unknown key K from the output of an easily computable keyed function F(C, K) where the attacker has the power to choose the public variable C. In this work we focus on self-synchronizing stream ciphers. First we show how to model these primitives in the above-mentioned general problem by relating appropriate functions F to the underlying ciphers. Then we apply the recently proposed framework presented at AfricaCrypt'08 by Fischer et. al. for dealing with this kind of problems to the proposed T-function based self-synchronizing stream cipher by Klimov and Shamir at FSE'05 and show how to deduce some non-trivial information about the key. We also open a new window for answering a crucial question raised by Fischer et. al. regarding the problem of finding weak IV bits which is essential for their attack.

Springer-Verlag New York, Ms Ingrid Cunningham, 175 Fifth Ave, New York, Ny 10010 Usa2008

Chargement