Gestion alternative | EPFL Graph Search

thumb|Les investissements des fonds spéculatifs entre 2000 et 2007 La gestion alternative (en anglais : hedge fund) est un mode de gestion de portefeuille alternative risqué par lequel le fonds d'investissement qui investit mobilise des actifs liquides et recourt à des montages financiers complexes et à des techniques de management du risque pour améliorer ses performances. La gestion alternative utilise notamment la vente à découvert, l'effet de levier et les produits dérivés. Cette méthode est appliquée par certains fonds d'investissement, les « fonds spéculatifs » (ou « fonds alternatifs », « fonds d'arbitrage », ou encore « fonds de couverture »). De plus, n'étant par essence pas aussi réglementés que les fonds de placement classiques, ils ne peuvent être distribués au grand public et sont réservés à la catégorie des investisseurs institutionnels ou aux grandes fortunes. Concept La gestion alternative est difficilement définissable, comme le sont les hedge funds qui l

Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance

Stefano Colonnello

This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines whether the availability of credit default swaps (CDS) has consequences for creditor governance. CDSs offer creditors the opportunity to hedge credit risk and may impact their willingness to renegotiate debt agreements after covenant violations and to monitor firms. I show that firms implement more conservative investment and financing policies after covenant violations if CDSs are traded on their debt, consistent with heightened renegotiation frictions. Moreover, firms with traded CDS contracts exhibit significantly worse operating and stock performance after covenant violations. Overall, these findings point to an exacerbation of debt-equity conflicts due to the availability of CDSs. Finally, I analyze the interaction of creditor governance and internal governance, and provide evidence suggesting that the possibility to hedge risk through CDSs also reduces creditors' incentives to monitor firms. The second chapter models the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. I show that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. I also show that this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, I provide evidence supportive of the model's prediction. First, I find that equity-based incentives are reduced during recessions. Second, I show that the magnitude of this effect is increasing in a firm's cash flow cyclicality. The third chapter analyzes the impact of the formation of universal banks on corporate investment by looking at the gradual dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act's separation between commercial and investment banking. Using a matched sample of U.S. firms and their relationship banks, I show that firms curtail investment after positive shocks to the underwriting capacity of their main bank. This result is driven by unrated firms and is strongest in the first two years after a shock. Moreover, I obtain similar results for borrowing firms' net debt issuance activity. As an exogenous shock to the formation of universal banks in the U.S., I also use the 1997 loosening of restrictions on commercial banks' securities activities. My findings suggest that universal banks may pay more attention to large and transparent firms that provide more underwriting opportunities while exacerbating financial constraints of opaque firms.

EPFL2015

Financial Stability and the Macroeconomy

Corinne Dubois

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 drew attention to the essential role of banks for the macroeconomy and to the importance of having a resilient financial sector. A vulnerability in the financial sector spills over to the real economy and can drive it into a deep recession. Following the financial crisis, policy makers have issued rules and regulations aimed at strengthening the banks. My dissertation considers some of those measures, namely bank liquidity regulation and deposit insurance, and tries to assess their effectiveness in stabilizing the financial sector and the economy in general. The first chapter (joint with Prof. Luisa Lambertini) develops a model with regulated banks and a hedge fund to analyze the behavior of wholesale funding and the macroeconomic consequences of liquidity regulation. Banks raise deposits and subordinated wholesale funding from the hedge fund. Wholesale funding amplifies shocks: it is curtailed in economic downturns to avoid leveraging up and risk-taking by banks, further depressing credit and economic activity. By making banks safer, liquidity regulation increases wholesale funding and bank loans at the steady state. However, flat liquidity regulation requiring banks to hold a constant fraction of liquid assets can have unintended consequences and increase macroeconomic volatility. Our model further shows that cyclically adjusted regulation stabilizes the response of the economy to shocks. We also provide empirical evidence suggesting that liquidity helps contain the contraction in wholesale funding and loans during times of funding stress. The second chapter explores the macroeconomic and welfare implications of harmonizing or joining deposit insurance in the Eurozone. I develop a two-country model to represent the core and periphery countries in the Eurozone. The model features fragile banks that can be subject to endogenous and costly runs. The two countries are financially integrated through an international interbank market. I introduce deposit insurance and compare different insurance regimes in steady state and along the business cycle. The model emphasizes that financial integration implies co-movement in asset prices and the transmission of shocks across the border. I find that when deposit insurance has lower coverage in the periphery than in the core, financial stability is undermined in both regions due to higher asset price volatility and a higher probability of deposit runs. Hence, either harmonizing or joining deposit insurance leads to substantial welfare benefits for both countries. In the third chapter, I develop a macroeconomic model with multiple equilibria and bank runs to analyze deposit insurance. A bank run is a sunspot equilibrium, and it is caused by a self-fulfilling panic of all depositors. The model features a unique no-run equilibrium when macroeconomic conditions are good, but an unexpected negative shock may open up the possibility of a run equilibrium. A bank run is a rare but costly event that drives the economy in a long and severe recession. I analyze the introduction and build-up of a deposit insurance fund and show that it reduces the cost and probability of bank runs. The dynamic simulation of the model reveals that deposit insurance diminishes macroeconomic and financial instability following a technological shock.

EPFL2018

Three Essays on Asset Pricing

Emmanuel Leclercq

In the first chapter,which is a joint work with Mathieu Cambou and Philippe H.A. Charmoy, we study the distribution of the hedging errors of a European call option for the delta and variance-minimizing strategies. Considering the setting proposed by Heston (1993), we assess the error distribution by computing its moments under the real-world probability measure. It turns out that one is better off implementing either a delta hedging or a variance-minimizing strategy, depending on the strike and maturity of the option under consideration. In the second paper, which is a joint work with Damir Filipovic and Loriano Mancini, we develop a practicable continuous-time dynamic arbitrage-free model for the pricing of European contingent claims. Using the framework introduced by Carmona and Nadtochiy (2011, 2012), the stock price is modeled as a semi-martingale process and, at each time t , the marginal distribution of the European option prices is coded by an auxiliary process that starts at t and follows an exponential additive process. The jump intensity that characterizes these auxiliary processes is then set in motion by means of stochastic dynamics of Itô's type. The model is a modification of the one proposed by Carmona and Nadtochiy, as only finitely many jump sizes are assumed. This crucial assumption implies that the jump intensities are taken values in only a finitedimensional space. In this setup, explicit necessary and sufficient consistency conditions that guarantee the absence of arbitrage are provided. A practicable dynamic model verifying them is proposed and estimated, using options on the S&P 500. Finally, the hedging of variance swap contracts is considered. It is shown that under certain conditions, a variance-minimizing hedging portfolio gives lower hedging errors on average, compared to a model-free hedging strategy. In the third and last chapter, which is a joint work with Rémy Praz, we concentrate on the commodity markets and try to understand the impact of financiers on the hedging decisions. We look at the changes in the spot price, variance, production and hedging choices of both producers and financiers, when the mass of financiers in the economy increases. We develop an equilibrium model of commodity spot and futures markets in which commodity production, consumption, and speculation are endogenously determined. Financiers facilitate hedging by the commodity suppliers. The entry of new financiers thus increases the supply of the commodity and decreases the expected spot prices, to the benefits of the end-users. However, this entry may be detrimental to the producers, as they do not internalize the price reduction due to greater aggregate supply. In the presence of asymmetric information, speculation on the futures market serves as a learning device. The futures price and open interest reveal different pieces of private information regarding the supply and demand side of the spot market, respectively. When the accuracy of private information is low, the entry of new financiers makes both production and spot prices more volatile. The entry of new financiers typically increases the correlation between financial and commodity markets.

EPFL2014