Conseil de stabilité financière

Le Conseil de stabilité financière ou CSF (en anglais Financial Stability Board ou FSB), est un groupement économique international créé lors de la réunion du G20 à Londres en avril 2009. Il succède au Forum de stabilité financière (Financial Stability Forum ou FSF) institué en 1999 à l'initiative du G7. Il regroupe 26 autorités financières nationales (banques centrales, ministères des finances, etc.), plusieurs organisations internationales et groupements élaborant des normes dans le domaine de la stabilité financière. Ses objectifs relèvent de la coopération dans le domaine de la supervision et de la surveillance des institutions financières. Historique Le Forum de stabilité financière (FSF) est né en 1999. Son origine remonte à octobre 1998, après l'achèvement des travaux du Willard Group (du nom de l'hôtel où se tenait les réunions du groupe de travail), lorsque les ministres et gouverneurs du G 7 confièrent à Hans Tietmeyer alors président de la Bundesbank, une miss

Essays on Mortgage Supply in a Low Rate Environment and Gender Effects of Covid-19

Yu Wu

After the financial crisis, policy rates in the major advanced economies have moved downwards to near/below zero. Some countries have experienced an increase in house prices and an expansion of mortgages. Also, there have been considerable changes in the mortgage market share, with only a few bank categories contributing to this mortgage expansion. Such change in exposure to real estate risk may pose a risk to financial stability. My dissertation research studies the role played by specific bank features, such as reliance on deposits and covered bonds or capital surplus relative to the required level, in explaining banks' different mortgage lending behavior. The first chapter (joint with Prof. Luisa Lambertini) studies the Swiss mortgage market dynamics in a low rate environment. After 2008, small banks (cantonal banks and Raiffeisen) have primarily contributed to this mortgage expansion at the expense of two big global systemic banks (UBS and Credit Suisse). We set up a model featuring big and small banks that compete in the deposit and mortgage market and face different capital requirements. We calibrate it to the Swiss banking sector. In this model, a falling policy rate drives up borrowing demand and leads to an expansion in mortgage supply; however, an asymmetric tightening of capital requirement gives small banks a competitive advantage and causes a shift in market share towards small banks. In the second chapter, with Prof. Luisa Lambertini, we use the Swedish bank-level data and employ a triple diff strategy to investigate whether funding side differences also play a role in explaining banks' different lending responses to the negative rate policy. First, we find that high-deposit banks expand their mortgage supply less than low-deposit banks during negative rate periods, confirming the well-documented deposit channel effect. However, this pattern works only for weakly-capitalized banks, which have a low capital buffer. Second, we show that banks more reliant on covered bonds to finance mortgage lending lend out more under negative rates; they can shift into cheap deposits to reduce their funding costs. We extend our model in the first chapter to be consistent with these empirical findings and use it to study the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic for the mortgage market. The third chapter analyzes the transmission of housing price dynamics to the real economy in the context of China, which went through a decade-long housing boom. Understanding its propagation to other economic activities is thus important. I build up a real business cycle model for this study and find that land-use conversion by the governments and land finance of housing firms can amplify the crowding-out effects of housing price fluctuations on the non-housing sector. The year 2020 was marked by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, which adversely affected the labor market. The fourth chapter is an additional line of work, with Dr. Corinne Dubois and Prof. Luisa Lambertini exploring gendered consequences of the pandemic in the Swiss labor market. We use the Swiss labor force survey data and find that all else equal, women have been more likely to exit the labor market altogether or to use short-term working schemes than their male counterparts. Contrary to expectations, increased family-care responsibility is not the main driver. Telework availability of occupation, however, explains some of the differential impact of Covid-19 on men and women.

EPFL2021

Financial Stability and the Macroeconomy

Corinne Dubois

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 drew attention to the essential role of banks for the macroeconomy and to the importance of having a resilient financial sector. A vulnerability in the financial sector spills over to the real economy and can drive it into a deep recession. Following the financial crisis, policy makers have issued rules and regulations aimed at strengthening the banks. My dissertation considers some of those measures, namely bank liquidity regulation and deposit insurance, and tries to assess their effectiveness in stabilizing the financial sector and the economy in general. The first chapter (joint with Prof. Luisa Lambertini) develops a model with regulated banks and a hedge fund to analyze the behavior of wholesale funding and the macroeconomic consequences of liquidity regulation. Banks raise deposits and subordinated wholesale funding from the hedge fund. Wholesale funding amplifies shocks: it is curtailed in economic downturns to avoid leveraging up and risk-taking by banks, further depressing credit and economic activity. By making banks safer, liquidity regulation increases wholesale funding and bank loans at the steady state. However, flat liquidity regulation requiring banks to hold a constant fraction of liquid assets can have unintended consequences and increase macroeconomic volatility. Our model further shows that cyclically adjusted regulation stabilizes the response of the economy to shocks. We also provide empirical evidence suggesting that liquidity helps contain the contraction in wholesale funding and loans during times of funding stress. The second chapter explores the macroeconomic and welfare implications of harmonizing or joining deposit insurance in the Eurozone. I develop a two-country model to represent the core and periphery countries in the Eurozone. The model features fragile banks that can be subject to endogenous and costly runs. The two countries are financially integrated through an international interbank market. I introduce deposit insurance and compare different insurance regimes in steady state and along the business cycle. The model emphasizes that financial integration implies co-movement in asset prices and the transmission of shocks across the border. I find that when deposit insurance has lower coverage in the periphery than in the core, financial stability is undermined in both regions due to higher asset price volatility and a higher probability of deposit runs. Hence, either harmonizing or joining deposit insurance leads to substantial welfare benefits for both countries. In the third chapter, I develop a macroeconomic model with multiple equilibria and bank runs to analyze deposit insurance. A bank run is a sunspot equilibrium, and it is caused by a self-fulfilling panic of all depositors. The model features a unique no-run equilibrium when macroeconomic conditions are good, but an unexpected negative shock may open up the possibility of a run equilibrium. A bank run is a rare but costly event that drives the economy in a long and severe recession. I analyze the introduction and build-up of a deposit insurance fund and show that it reduces the cost and probability of bank runs. The dynamic simulation of the model reveals that deposit insurance diminishes macroeconomic and financial instability following a technological shock.

EPFL2018

Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage

Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. We show that the FRM market share is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods in which private securitization markets are well functioning.