Cross-site scripting

Résumé

vignette|Le diagramme de séquence d'une attaque de type cross-site scripting. en Le cross-site scripting (abrégé XSS) est un type de faille de sécurité des sites web permettant d'injecter du contenu dans une page, provoquant ainsi des actions sur les navigateurs web visitant la page. Les possibilités des XSS sont très larges puisque l'attaquant peut utiliser tous les langages pris en charge par le navigateur (JavaScript, Java...) et de nouvelles possibilités sont régulièrement découvertes notamment avec l'arrivée de nouvelles technologies comme HTML5. Il est par exemple possible de rediriger vers un autre site pour de l'hameçonnage ou encore de voler la session en récupérant les cookies. Le cross-site scripting est abrégé XSS pour ne pas être confondu avec le CSS (feuilles de style), X se lisant (croix, à travers) en anglais. Définition Le terme cross-site scripting n'est pas une description très précise de ce type de vulnérabilité. Mark Slemko, pionnier du XSS, en disait

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting

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Mobile users expose their location to potentially untrusted entities by using location-based services. Based on the frequency of location exposure in these applications, we divide them into two main types: Continuous and Sporadic. These two location exposure types lead to different threats. For example, in the continuous case, the adversary can track users over time and space, whereas in the sporadic case, his focus is more on localizing users at certain points in time. We propose a systematic way to quantify users' location privacy by modeling both the location-based applications and the location-privacy preserving mechanisms (LPPMs), and by considering a well-defined adversary model. This framework enables us to customize the LPPMs to the employed location-based application, in order to provide higher location privacy for the users. In this paper, we formalize localization attacks for the case of sporadic location exposure, using Bayesian inference for Hidden Markov Processes. We also quantify user location privacy with respect to the adversaries with two different forms of background knowledge: Those who only know the geographical distribution of users over the considered regions, and those who also know how users move between the regions (i.e., their mobility pattern). Using the Location-Privacy Meter tool, we examine the effectiveness of the following techniques in increasing the expected error of the adversary in the localization attack: Location obfuscation and fake location injection mechanisms for anonymous traces.

Springer-Verlag Berlin2011

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We present a new lazy replication technique, suitable for scaling the back-end database of a dynamic content site using a cluster of commodity computers. Our technique, called conflict-aware scheduling, provides both throughput scaling and 1-copy serializability. It has generally been believed that this combination is hard to achieve through replication because of the growth of the number of conflicts. We take advantage of the presence in a database cluster of a scheduler through which all incoming requests pass. We require that transactions specify the tables that they access at the beginning of the transaction. Using that information, a conflictaware scheduler relies on a sequence-numbering scheme to implement 1-copy serializability, and directs incoming queries in such a way that the number of conflicts is reduced. We evaluate conflict-aware scheduling using the TPCW e-commerce benchmark. For small clusters of up to eight database replicas, our evaluation is performed through measurements of a web site implementing the TPC-W specification. We use simulation to extend our measurement results to larger clusters, faster database engines, and lower conflict rates. Our results show that conflict-awareness brings considerable benefits compared to both eager and conflictoblivious lazy replication for a large range of cluster sizes, database speeds, and conflict rates. Conflict-aware scheduling provides near-linear throughput scaling up to a large number of database replicas for the browsing and shopping workloads of TPC-W. For the write-heavy ordering workload, throughput scales, but only to a smaller number of replicas.

2003

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Digital Signature Schemes with Domain Parameters

Serge Vaudenay

Digital signature schemes often use domain parameters such as prime numbers or elliptic curves. They can be subject to security threats when they are not treated like public keys. In this paper we formalize the notion of "signature scheme with domain parameter" together with a new adversarial model: the "domain parameter shifting attack". We take ECDSA as a case study. We make a domain parameter shifting attack against ECDSA: an attacker can impersonate a honest signer either by trying to modify the subgroup generator G or, when using point compression representation, by trying to modify the elliptic curve a and b domain parameters. We further propose to fix this ECDSA issue.

2004

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