Sélection adverse

Résumé

La sélection adverse ou antisélection est un phénomène statistique et économique qui joue un rôle important notamment dans les domaines de l'assurance et de la gestion du risque, par lequel une offre faite sur un marché aboutit à des résultats inverses de ceux souhaités, à cause d'asymétries d'information. C'est une forme du problème principal-agent. Dans une situation principal-agent, le problème de la sélection adverse est essentiellement basé sur l'incertitude concernant le type de l'agent, contrairement à une situation d'aléa moral. Elle se manifeste par la difficulté pour le client d’appréhender :

le niveau de compétence et d’expérience des fournisseurs ;
l’adéquation du produit ou des compétences du fournisseur à ses besoins ;
le contenu et la qualité effective du produit ou du service.

Contrat incomplet et sélection adverse Les contrats incomplets comportent des asymétries d'informations, c'est-à-dire qu'il y a une répartition inégale de l'information entre

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A9lection_adverse

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Essays in Corporate Finance

Thomas Antonius Geelen

In this thesis I study how firms choose their optimal debt maturity. The recent financial crisis illustrated why debt maturity is an important determinant of firmsâ capital structure and it also renewed economistsâ interest in this topic, see for example Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), He and Milbradt (2016), Ju and Ou-Yang (2006), Crouzet (2016), and Huang et al. (2017). This thesis exists of two chapters. In the first chapter, titled âInformation Dynamics and Debt Maturityâ, I develop a dynamic model of financing decisions and optimal debt maturity choice in which creditors face adverse selection and learn about the firmâs quality from news. In equilibrium, shareholders may choose to postpone debt issuance to reduce adverse selection and improve the pricing of newly issued debt. Over time, the benefits of learning decrease and zero-leverage firms eventually decide to issue debt. Because shorter maturity debt is less sensitive to information, younger firms issue shorter maturity debt to alleviate adverse selection while mature firms issue longer maturity debt, leading to a life-cycle theory of debt maturity. In the second chapter, titled âDebt Maturity and Lumpy Debtâ, I develop a dynamic capital structure model in which shareholders determine a firmâs leverage ratio, debt maturity, and default strategy. In my model, the firmâs debt matures all at once. Therefore, after repaying the principal shareholders own all the firmâs cash flows and can pick a new capital structure. The possibility to alter the capital structure at maturity gives shareholders the incentive to issue finite maturity debt and allows me to study firmsâ joint choice of leverage and debt maturity. I also extend my model by allowing for time-varying capital supply to study time-variation in firmsâ joint choice of leverage and debt maturity.

EPFL2018

Chargement

This thesis is structured in three chapters, each pertaining to a specific problem in financial economics. The first chapter, titled 'High-Frequency Jump Analysis of the Bitcoin Market' and co-authored with Prof. Olivier Scaillet and Adrien Treccani of the University of Geneva, studies the market for bitcoin, a pioneer virtual currency, and its price dynamics. Using data for all the trades that took place on the exchange Mt. Gox during the period June 2011 to November 2013, we analyse the occurrence of jumps in the price process and conclude that they are frequent (one jump per week, on average) and that they tend to cluster in time. They are predicted by the order flow imbalance and the preponderance of aggressive traders. Jumps have a short-term positive impact on market activity and illiquidity and see a persistent change in the price. The second chapter, titled 'Price Formation in the Bitcoin Market', studies the same bitcoin market from the point of view of information and the way it is incorporated in the price. I analyse different measures of liquidity and price impact and find that bitcoin exhibits more adverse selection than comparable stocks. I examine the potential profits of liquidity provision and conclude that they are insufficient, which explains the absence of market makers and consequently the low market depth. I estimate a vector autoregressive model for the returns and a trade indicator and find that the effect of past returns and past trades on contemporaneous trades is significant and singular, indicating that agents infer considerable information which leads them to update their beliefs about the future evolution of the price, consistent with the view that bitcoin is a Keynesian beauty contest. The third chapter, titled 'Cash Holdings and Credit Risk', investigates the a priori surprising empirical phenomenon that firms with larger cash holdings appear to be riskier with regards to the valuation of their debt. It is explained by the endogeneity affecting the relation between a firm's cash holdings and credit spread. Indeed, a firm facing more risk (for instance, because its cash flows are more volatile) will optimally choose larger cash holdings as a hedge. I review the related literature and present a class of continuous-time capital structure models capable of capturing this phenomenon.

EPFL2016

Chargement

Signaling in OTC Markets: Benefits and Costs of Transparency

Alberto Mokak Teguia

We provide a theoretical rationale for dealer objections to ex post transparency in over-the-counter markets. Disclosure of the terms of a transaction conveys information possessed by the dealer about the asset quality and reduces the dealer's rents when she disposes of the inventory in a second transaction. We show that costly signaling in a transparent market benefits investors through lower spreads and higher volume. Dealers may also gain from transparency despite lower spreads when potential gains from trade are small or adverse selection is high, because in those circumstances higher volume offsets smaller spreads for dealer profits.

CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS2020

Chargement

EPFL2016