Organisation des Nations unies

Résumé

L’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) est une organisation internationale regroupant membres depuis le 14 juillet 2011. Elle a été instituée le par la ratification de la Charte des Nations unies signée le par les représentants de . Elle remplace alors la Société des Nations. Les objectifs premiers de l'organisation sont le maintien de la paix et la sécurité internationale. Pour les accomplir, elle promeut la protection des droits de l'homme, la fourniture de l'aide humanitaire, le développement durable et la garantie du droit international et dispose de pouvoirs spécifiques tels que l'établissement de sanctions internationales et l'intervention militaire. La Charte des Nations unies définit six organes principaux : l'Assemblée générale, le Conseil de sécurité, le Conseil économique et social, le Conseil de tutelle, la Cour internationale de justice et le Secrétariat. Le système des Nations unies inclut plus largement des programmes, fonds, institutions spécialisées et apparenté

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_des_Nations_unies

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Cours associés (25)

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Séances de cours associées (31)

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On the Design of a Youth-Led, Issue-Based, Crowdsourced Global Monitoring Framework for the SDGs

Sharada Prasanna Mohanty, Rajiv Ramaswamy

In this paper, we propose a novel methodology and design to contribute towards the achievement of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by member states of the United Nations for a better and more sustainable future for all. We particularly focus on achieving SDG 4.7—using education to ensure all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development. We describe the design of a crowdsourced approach to monitor issues at a local level, and then use the insights gained to indicate how learning can be achieved by the entire community. We begin by encouraging local communities to identify issues that they are concerned about, with an assumption that any issue identified will fall within the purview of the 17 SDGs. Each issue is then tagged with a plurality of actions taken to address it. Finally, we tag the positive or negative changes in the issue as perceived by members of the local community. This data is used to broadly indicate quantitative measures of community learning when solving a societal problem, in turn telling us how SDG 4.7 is being achieved. The paper describes the design of a unique, youth-led, technology-based, bottom-up approach, applicable to communities across the globe, which can potentially ensure transgressive learning through participation of and monitoring by the local community leading to sustainable development

2019

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WHO WALKS THE TALK? VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS’ ACTIONS AFTER SYMBOLIC SELF-REGULATION OF LIMITED AND GENERAL PARTNERS

Giovanni Liotta

This paper investigates if organizations use symbolic self-regulation to escape from normative pressure without complying in practices. I argue that, when an explicit regulatory environment does not support self-regulation initiatives, opportunistic organizations might reduce their efforts to conform to the normative ideals through real actions. The ‘walking of the talk’, which is the implementation of actions that go beyond symbolic response, might also be discouraged by alternative means to obtain organizational legitimacy such as an organization’s reputation and status. These hypotheses are tested on a sample of venture capital (VC) funds whose limited and general partners might have voluntarily decided to join the United Nations’ Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI) initiative. Empirical findings show that VC funds’ likelihood to invest in clean technology companies decreases when one of the fund’s stakeholders (i.e. general or limited partners) joins the UNPRI initiative. Results also suggest that this effect is conditional upon the reputation and status of the VC fund.

2016

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This thesis proposes three studies that provide novel empirical evidence on how different types of VCs' characteristics signal the quality of an entrepreneurial venture and influence investment strategies of funds subject to self-regulation. In the first study we aim at contributing to the ongoing debate on the different effects of reputation and status on organizational outcomes. We explore the signaling value that these two organizational attributes exert on external parties judging the quality of entrepreneurial ventures under uncertainty. Moreover, we examine whether signaling mechanisms are valuable only if the external parties are affected by high information asymmetry with the valued venture. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 1,339 U.S. clean technology ventures that received the first round of Venture Capital (VC) between the years 1990 and 2012. We look at their ability to gather supplemental financial resources for survival and growth by completing an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or an acquisition by an incumbent firm. The findings indicate that VCs' reputation - an economic attribute based on past performance - can signal a venture's quality externally, while VCs' status - a social-standing attribute - does not have signaling value. The results also show that quality signals are more relevant for public investors at IPOs than for managers of acquiring companies. The second study looks at how inter-organizational ties with reputable VCs affect valuations received by entrepreneurial ventures that go public. I propose that the signaling effect of reputable VC ties is lower when there is misalignment of strategic interests between the venture and the VCs. I consider the amount of shares sold by insiders in the initial public offering (IPO) and investors' enforcement of demand registration rights as elements indicating misalignment of interests with the venture. The hypotheses are tested on using a sample of 86 IPOs in the main U.S. stock exchanges completed by entrepreneurial ventures operating in the Clean Technology sector. The results suggest that affiliation with reputable VCs elicits a positive response by public investors. However, public markets react less favorably to ties with reputable VCs when they sell large amount of their shares in the IPO or resort to demand registration rights to force the public offering of their shares. The third study investigates organizations' use of self-regulation as form of symbolic response to normative pressure that does not necessarily entail compliance in practices. I argue that, when self-regulatory initiatives are not supported by an explicit regulatory environment, opportunistic organizations might reduce their efforts to align with the normative ideals through compliant actions and behaviors. The "walking of the talk", which is the implementation of actions that are aligned with the symbolic response, might also be discouraged by alternative means to obtain organizational legitimacy, such as through an organization's status. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of Venture Capital (VC) funds whose limited or general partners voluntarily decided to join the United Nations' Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI, 2006) initiative between 2006 and 2014. The results from a difference-in-differences estimation show that VC funds' likelihood to invest in clean technology companies is lower after funds' stakeholders (i.e. general or limited partners) join the UNPRI initiative. I also find that the likelihood to invest in clean technologies after self-regulation is negatively moderated by the VC fund's status.

EPFL2016

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EPFL2016