Concept
Monétarisme
Publications associées (8)
Monetary-Labor Interactions, International Monetary Regimes, and Central Bank Conservatism
A two-country general equilibrium model with large wage setters and conservative monetary authorities is employed to investigate the welfare implications of three international monetary regimes: i) non-cooperative, ii) cooperative, and iii) monetary union. ...
Center for Fiscal Policy Working Paper Series2009International monetary policy cooperation revisited: conservatism and non-atomistic wage setting
This paper presents a simple model of policy coordination in line with the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature. I extent the analysis on non-cooperative toward cooperative solutions by incorporating a collective wage bargaining system and conservati ...
Center for Fiscal Policy Working Paper Series2009The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance
This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal m ...
2009Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the EMU: Does Fiscal Policy Coordination matter?
I develop and analyze a DSGE model of a currency union to revise the question of how to conduct monetary and fiscal policy in countries that share the same currency. In contrast with the previous literature which assumes coordination, this paper analyzes t ...
Center for Fiscal Policy Working Paper Series2009Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union
We study optimal fiscal policy in a monetary union where monetary policy is decided by an independent central bank. We consider a two-country model with trade in goods and assets, augmented with sticky prices, labor income taxes and stochastic government c ...
Center for Fiscal Policy Working Paper Series2007Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and Commitment Versus Discretion in a Monetary Union
We consider monetary fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. If monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets, the Nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities. Lead ...
Elsevier2001