Norme sociale

Résumé

vignette|Se serrer la main entre adversaires sportifs, ici pour un match de tennis, est un exemple de norme sociale. Une norme sociale réfère à une façon de faire ou d'agir, une règle de conduite tacite ou écrite, qui a prévalence dans une société ou un groupe social donné. Elle est légitimée par des habitudes, des valeurs, des croyances partagées au sein d'un collectif donné, ainsi que par le contrôle social exercé. Origine du concept Champ d'action Les normes sociales définissent ce qui est socialement acceptable de faire et d'être en distinguant les comportements et les attitudes, qui sont conformes aux attentes, des comportements et attitudes qui sont jugés déviants. Elles traduisent les valeurs et les idéaux dominants d'une société ou d'un groupe. Il n'est pas obligatoire que tous les groupes d'une même société donnée partagent les mêmes normes, c'est même rarement le cas. Ces divergences entre les normes apportent des conflits sur les façons adéquates d

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https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norme_sociale

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Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement

Stephan Meier

Monetary incentives, such as subsidies or bonuses, are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of private contribution incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be effective in raising contributions by itself. We test whether and how (centrally provided) private incentives interact with (decentralized) punishment, both of which affect subjects’ monetary payoffs. The results of our experiment show that private incentives for contributors can reduce the effectiveness of the norm enforcement mechanism: Free riders are punished less harshly in the treatment with incentives, and as a consequence, average contributions to the public good are no higher than without incentives. This finding ties to and extends previous research on settings in which monetary incentives may fail to have the desired effect.

2010

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Studies on preferences for environmental quality usually posit that price and income explain most of the observed choices. However, we argue that conceptions of social norms and the common good are equally important when analyzing environmental voting outcomes and are a significant component of the environmental demand. We study aggregate results of three ballot proposals in Switzerland put to vote in the year 2000 which foresaw different tax schemes on fossil energy. All three bills were rejected by the electorate. We are able to show that regions with producer interests, car commuting habits and elderly population are less supportive of ecological tax reforms, unlike higher education and leftist political affinity that work in favor of the bills, though. More importantly, our results underline the importance of including variables pertaining to the notion of ideology, both in terms of statistical fit and obtaining unbiased estimates for price and income determinants.

2008

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Explaining the diversity of motivations behind community renewable energy

Thomas Jean F Bauwens

Community-based renewable energy initiatives may be important actors in the transition toward low-carbon energy systems. In turn, stimulating investments in renewable energy production at the community level requires a better understanding of investors' motives. This paper aims to study the heterogeneity of motivations that drive individuals to participate in community renewable energy projects and the underlying explanatory factors behind this, as well as the implications for their level of engagement in initiatives. Based on quantitative data from an original survey conducted with two renewable energy cooperatives in Flanders, the statistical analysis shows that cooperative members should not be considered as one homogeneous group. Several categories of members with different motives and levels of engagement can be distinguished. This heterogeneity is explained by contrasts in terms of institutional settings, spatial patterns and attitudes to the diffusion of institutional innovations. Regarding policy implications, the findings suggest that this heterogeneity should be taken into account in designing more effective supporting policies to stimulate investments at the community level. The activation of social norms is also shown to be a promising mechanism for triggering investment decisions, although the implications of its interplay with economic incentives should be further explored.

Elsevier2016

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