Robustesse d'un mot de passe

Résumé

La robustesse d'un mot de passe est la mesure de la capacité d'un mot de passe à résister à son cassage, que ce soit par des moyens permettant de le deviner ou par une attaque par force brute. On mesure la robustesse d'un mot de passe en estimant le nombre de tentatives nécessaires à un attaquant pour le casser. La robustesse d'un mot de passe est une fonction :

de sa longueur (un mot de passe de 10 caractères est plus robuste qu'un mot de passe de 6 caractères, les attaques par force brute commençant par tester les mots de passe les plus courts) ;
de sa complexité, c'est-à-dire du nombre de symboles différents utilisés pour construire le mot de passe (à longueur égale, un mot de passe contenant des chiffres ainsi que des lettres sera plus robuste qu'un mot de passe contenant seulement des chiffres) ;
de son caractère aléatoire (le mot de passe 428195 est légèrement plus robuste que le mot de passe 123456, qui est un mot de passe très populaire). Si l'utilisatio

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustesse_d'un_mot_de_passe

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Interactive Mobile Robotic Drinking Glasses

Michele Leidi, Francesco Mondada, François Rey

The central idea behind this attempt is to merge common objects and robotics to obtain a new type of interactive artefact, we call robjects. Robjects provide services to everyday life and can be controlled by the user in a very intuitive way. Robjects take rarely the initiative, have few decisional autonomy. Most of their activity is centered and controlled by the interaction with the user. To test this concept in a concrete experimentwe decided to include mobile robotic technology into drinking glasses to improve their service on a table. Making them mobile and interactive brings a new dimension to the table, simplifies service and improves security. The system works in the following manner : when a user starts filling a glass, the other empty glasses come closer to get filled too and then go back to their initial position. Owners of the glasses can refuse to fill their glasses by simply bringing back the glass on its initial position as soon as the glass starts to move. The system has been prototyped and tested. The analysis of the interaction of some users shows strengths in interactivity and weaknesses in the speed of the system and in reliability of the actual prototype.

Springer2009

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Secure storage of genomic data is of great and increasing importance. The scientific community's improving ability to interpret individuals' genetic materials and the growing size of genetic database populations have been aggravating the potential consequences of data breaches. The prevalent use of passwords to generate encryption keys thus poses an especially serious problem when applied to genetic data. Weak passwords can jeopardize genetic data in the short term; given the multi-decade lifespan of genetic data, even the use of strong passwords with conventional encryption can lead to compromise. We present a tool called {\em GenoGuard} to provide strong protection for genomic data both today and in the long term. GenoGuard incorporates a new theoretical framework for encryption called honey encryption (HE) that can provide information-theoretic confidentiality guarantees for encrypted data. Previously proposed HE schemes, however, can unfortunately be applied to messages from only a very restricted set of probability distributions. GenoGuard thus addresses the open problem of applying HE techniques to the highly non-uniform probability distributions characterizing sequences of genetic data. In GenoGuard, a potential adversary can attempt to guess keys or passwords exhaustively and decrypt via a brute-force attack. We prove that decryption under any key, however, will yield a plausible genome sequence; thus GenoGuard offers an information-theoretic security guarantee against message-recovery attacks. We also explore attacks using side information. Finally, we present an efficient and parallelized software implementation of GenoGuard.

2015

Chargement

GenoGuard: Protecting Genomic Data against Brute-Force Attacks

Erman Ayday, Jacques Fellay, Zhicong Huang, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Ari Juels

Secure storage of genomic data is of great and increasing importance. The scientific community's improving ability to interpret individuals' genetic materials and the growing size of genetic database populations have been aggravating the potential consequences of data breaches. The prevalent use of passwords to generate encryption keys thus poses an especially serious problem when applied to genetic data. Weak passwords can jeopardize genetic data in the short term, but given the multi-decade lifespan of genetic data, even the use of strong passwords with conventional encryption can lead to compromise. We present a tool, called {\em GenoGuard}, for providing strong protection for genomic data both today and in the long term. GenoGuard incorporates a new theoretical framework for encryption called honey encryption (HE): it can provide information-theoretic confidentiality guarantees for encrypted data. Previously proposed HE schemes, however, can be applied to messages from, unfortunately, a very restricted set of probability distributions. Therefore, GenoGuard addresses the open problem of applying HE techniques to the highly non-uniform probability distributions that characterize sequences of genetic data. In GenoGuard, a potential adversary can attempt exhaustively to guess keys or passwords and decrypt via a brute-force attack. We prove that decryption under any key will yield a plausible genome sequence, and that GenoGuard offers an information-theoretic security guarantee against message-recovery attacks. We also explore attacks that use side information. Finally, we present an efficient and parallelized software implementation of GenoGuard.

2015

Chargement