Banque centrale | EPFL Graph Search

vignette|Le siège de la Réserve fédérale à Washington, DC La banque centrale est une institution financière publique chargée par l'État de conduire la politique monétaire du pays ou de sa zone économique. Elle est régie par mandat qui précise ses objectifs, tels que la stabilité des prix, la confiance en la monnaie ou encore le plein emploi. Une banque centrale peut être indépendante du pouvoir politique. Définition Une banque centrale est une institution financière publique ou semi-publique, chargée de la gestion de la politique monétaire du pays de la banque centrale ou de la zone monétaire dont elle est chargée. Il n'existe pas un seul type de banques centrales, car chaque pays peut lui accorder des missions et lui conférer des outils différents. Les lois nationales ou des traités supranationaux peuvent également contraindre la banque centrale ou lui donner des pouvoirs d'action supplémentaires. Les objectifs de politique monétaire des banques centrales sont fixés par l

Asset Pricing and Monetary Policy

Nicolas Gauderon

Classical theory asserts that the formation of prices is the result of aggregated decisions ofeconomics agent such as households or corporation. However central banks are very importantagents that have often been neglected in asset pricing models. Central banks decisions ormonetary policy indeed appears to be a first order determinant of prices.This thesis aims to develop an asset pricing model that explicitly incorporates a central bankand to analyze the determination of monetary policy and its impact on financial markets. Myresults should help to improve our understanding of asset prices in the context of a monetaryeconomy. Therefore results should help both to improve portfolio management in presenceof an active monetary policy and to give central bankers a better understanding of their ownmarket impact thus helping them to design better monetary policy.

EPFL2022

Essays in Monetary Policy and Asset Pricing

Benoit Vincent Sylvain Cornet

This thesis uses machine learning techniques and text data to investigate the relationships that arise between the Fed and financial markets, and their consequences for asset prices.The first chapter, entitled Market Expectations and the Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy: An Application to Twitter Data, is an answer to (Greenlaw et al., 2018), who show, by looking at a large set of monetary policy announcements made between November 2008 and December 2017 - FOMC meetings, release of minutes and speeches of the Fed Chair - that long term yields tended to increase following these events. By doing so, the authors challenge common wisdom according to which the central bank intervention in the aftermath of the financial crisis lowered long term rates (Gagnon, 2016). Using machine learning and twitter data, this chapter develops a novel measure of market expectations of monetary policy, and shows that the increase in yields was simply due to a marginal adjustment of market expectations following announcements being less dovish than expected.The second chapter, entitled Informational Feedback Loop, Monetary Policy Decisions and Asset Prices Dynamics, investigates the consequences of a Fed that uses (1) its own private signal and (2) fed funds futures to take its monetary policy decision. Fed funds futures aggre- gate private information received by financial markets participants - traders - but they also depend on traders' expectations about the Fed's behavior, which makes futures endogenous in the central bank decision. The theoretical model shows that the surprise generated by monetary policy announcements and the subsequent adjustment in short term U.S. treasury yields depend on the precision of the signals received by each agent. When the signal received by traders is more precise than the central bank's, the latter relies more on fed funds futures to take its decision, and the surprise and adjustment of short term yields are smaller. By contrast, long term yields adjust only because the announcement provides traders with new information about the state of the economy, by revealing the central bank's private signal. Finally, when the Fed is averse to financial markets volatility, it tends to put some weight on fed funds futures even if they are not informative about the state of the economy. The empirical part of the paper provides some evidence supporting these channels, by using a topic and tone approach (Hansen and McMahon, 2016) to extract the precision of the signals received by the central bank and traders from FOMC minutes and tweets respectively.

EPFL2022

Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance

Stefano Colonnello

This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines whether the availability of credit default swaps (CDS) has consequences for creditor governance. CDSs offer creditors the opportunity to hedge credit risk and may impact their willingness to renegotiate debt agreements after covenant violations and to monitor firms. I show that firms implement more conservative investment and financing policies after covenant violations if CDSs are traded on their debt, consistent with heightened renegotiation frictions. Moreover, firms with traded CDS contracts exhibit significantly worse operating and stock performance after covenant violations. Overall, these findings point to an exacerbation of debt-equity conflicts due to the availability of CDSs. Finally, I analyze the interaction of creditor governance and internal governance, and provide evidence suggesting that the possibility to hedge risk through CDSs also reduces creditors' incentives to monitor firms. The second chapter models the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. I show that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. I also show that this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, I provide evidence supportive of the model's prediction. First, I find that equity-based incentives are reduced during recessions. Second, I show that the magnitude of this effect is increasing in a firm's cash flow cyclicality. The third chapter analyzes the impact of the formation of universal banks on corporate investment by looking at the gradual dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act's separation between commercial and investment banking. Using a matched sample of U.S. firms and their relationship banks, I show that firms curtail investment after positive shocks to the underwriting capacity of their main bank. This result is driven by unrated firms and is strongest in the first two years after a shock. Moreover, I obtain similar results for borrowing firms' net debt issuance activity. As an exogenous shock to the formation of universal banks in the U.S., I also use the 1997 loosening of restrictions on commercial banks' securities activities. My findings suggest that universal banks may pay more attention to large and transparent firms that provide more underwriting opportunities while exacerbating financial constraints of opaque firms.

EPFL2015

Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance

Stefano Colonnello

EPFL2015

Essays in Monetary Policy and Asset Pricing

Benoit Vincent Sylvain Cornet

EPFL2022