Concept

Théorie des enchères

Publications associées (34)

Safe multi-agent deep reinforcement learning for joint bidding and maintenance scheduling of generation units

This paper proposes a safe reinforcement learning algorithm for generation bidding decisions and unit maintenance scheduling in a competitive electricity market environment. In this problem, each unit aims to find a bidding strategy that maximizes its reve ...

ELSEVIER SCI LTD2023

No-Regret Learning from Partially Observed Data in Repeated Auctions

Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca

We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online using no-regret algorithms based on the data obser ...

2020

Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design

Cagil Kocyigit

Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...

EPFL2020

Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mechanism for selling multiple items to multiple anonymous bidders with additive values. The seller knows that the bidders' values range over a box uncertainty ...

2020

Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design

Daniel Kuhn, Cagil Kocyigit, Wolfram Wiesemann

We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for each of whom it has a private value that is unknown to the seller and the other bidders. The agents perceive the ensemble of all bidder values as a random v ...

2020

Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods

Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca

This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot inf ...

2019

A Truthful, Privacy-Preserving, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auction For Single-minded Bidders

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar, Sankarshan Damle

Combinatorial auctions are widely used to sell resources/items. The challenges in such auctions are multi-fold. We need to ensure that bidders, the strategic agents, bid their valuations truthfully to the auction mechanism. Besides, the agents may desire p ...

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2019

Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming

Cagil Kocyigit

It is commonly assumed in the optimal auction design literature that valuations of buyers are independently drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study auctions under ambiguity, that is, in an environment where valuation distribution is uncert ...

2018

Distributed Multi-Unit Privacy Assured Bidding (PAB) for Smart Grid Demand Response Programs

Muhammed Fatih Balli

The stringent requirement of the demand-supply equilibrium for delivering electricity has traditionally been dealt with a supply-side perspective, assuming that the demand is not alterable. With the promises of the Smart Grid, demand- side management techn ...

2018

Privacy Preserving and Cost Optimal Mobile Crowdsensing using Smart Contracts on Blockchain

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar, Dimitrios Chatzopoulos

The popularity and applicability of mobile crowdsensing applications are continuously increasing due to the widespread of mobile devices and their sensing and processing capabilities. However, we need to offer appropriate incentives to the mobile users who ...

IEEE2018

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