Galois/Counter Mode | EPFL Graph Search

Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) est un mode d'opération de chiffrement par bloc en cryptographie symétrique. Il est relativement répandu en raison de son efficacité et de ses performances. Les débits de GCM sur des canaux de communication haut débit peuvent être effectués avec des ressources matérielles raisonnables. C'est un algorithme de chiffrement authentifié conçu pour fournir à la fois l'intégrité et l'authenticité des données, ainsi que la confidentialité. Le chiffrement utilisé est basé sur un compteur (mode CTR) dans lequel la multiplication entre le compteur et la clef de 128 bits est effectuée dans le Corps de Galois. GCM est défini pour les chiffrements par bloc avec des tailles de bloc de 128 bits. Le code d'authentification du message de Galois — (GMAC) — est une variante limitée à l'authentification de GCM qui peut être utilisée comme code de message d'authentification incrémental. GCM et GMAC acceptent tous deux des vecteurs d'initialisation de longueur arbitraire. La nor

Optimal Symmetric Ratcheting for Secure Communication

Andrea Felice Caforio, Daniel Patrick Collins, Serge Vaudenay, Hailun Yan

To mitigate state exposure threats to long-lived instant messaging sessions, ratcheting was introduced, which is used in practice in protocols like Signal. However, existing ratcheting protocols generally come with a high cost. Recently, Caforio et al. proposed pragmatic constructions, which compose a weakly secure 'light' protocol and a strongly secure 'heavy' protocol, in order to achieve so-called ratcheting on-demand. The light protocol they proposed has still a high complexity. In this paper, we propose the lightest possible protocol we could imagine, which essentially encrypts and then hashes the secret key. We prove it secure in the standard model by introducing a new security notion, which relates symmetric encryption with key updates by hashing. Our protocol composes well with the generic transformation techniques by Caforio et al. to offer high security and performance at the same time. In a second step, we propose another protocol based on a newly defined integrated primitive, extending standard one-time authenticated encryption with an additional output block used as a secret key for the next message. We instantiate this primitive firstly from any authenticated encryption with associated data, and then we propose an efficient instantiation using advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption to update the key and AES-Galois/Counter mode of operation to encrypt and decrypt messages.

OXFORD UNIV PRESS2022

Can Caesar Beat Galois?

Serge Vaudenay, Damian Vizár

The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability and Robustness (CAESAR) has as its official goal to “identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer advantages over [the Galois-Counter Mode with AES]” and are suitable for widespread adoption.” Each of the 15 candidate schemes competing in the currently ongoing 3rd round of CAESAR must clearly declare its security claims, i.e. whether it can tolerate nonce misuse, and what is the maximal data complexity for which security is guaranteed. These claims appear to be valid for all 15 candidates. Interpreting “Robustness” in CAESAR as the ability to mitigate damage when security guarantees are void, we describe attacks with 64-bit complexity or above, and/or with nonce reuse for each of the 15 candidates. We then classify the candidates depending on how powerful does an attacker need to be to mount (semi-)universal forgeries, decryption attacks, or key recoveries. Rather than invalidating the security claims of any of the candidates, our results provide an additional criterion for evaluating the security that candidates deliver, which can be useful for e.g. breaking ties in the final CAESAR discussions.

2018

Boosting OMD for Almost Free Authentication of Associated Data

Reza Reyhanitabar, Serge Vaudenay, Damian Vizár

We propose pure OMD (p-OMD) as a new variant of the Offset Merkle-Damgård (OMD) authenticated encryption scheme. Our new scheme inherits all desirable security features of OMD while having a more compact structure and providing higher efficiency. The original OMD scheme, as submitted to the CAESAR competition, couples a single pass of a variant of the Merkle-Damgård (MD) iteration with the counter-based XOR MAC algorithm to provide privacy and authenticity. Our improved p-OMD scheme dispenses with the XOR MAC algorithm and is purely based on the MD iteration; hence, the name ``pure'' OMD. To process a message of

\ell

blocks and associated data of

a

blocks, OMD needs

\ell+a+2

calls to the compression function while p-OMD only requires max{

\ell, a

2

calls. Therefore, for a typical case where

\ell \geq a

, p-OMD makes just

\ell+2

calls to the compression function; that is, associated data is processed almost freely compared to OMD. We prove the security of p-OMD under the same standard assumption (pseudo-randomness of the compression function) as made in OMD; moreover, the security bound for p-OMD is the same as that of OMD, showing that the modifications made to boost the performance are without any loss of security.

Springer2015