Concept

Théorie des mécanismes d'incitation

Publications associées (15)

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Game-theoretic Mechanisms for Eliciting Accurate Information

Boi Faltings

Artificial Intelligence often relies on information obtained from others through crowdsourcing, federated learning, or data markets. It is crucial to ensure that this data is accurate. Over the past 20 years, a variety of incentive mechanisms have been dev ...

2022

Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design

Cagil Kocyigit

Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...

EPFL2020

Core-Selecting Mechanisms in Electricity Markets

Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca

Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of participants, however, can influence the VCG outcome to obtain higher collective u ...

2020

Deep Bayesian Trust : A Dominant and Fair Incentive Mechanism for Crowd

Boi Faltings, Naman Goel

An important class of game-theoretic incentive mechanisms for eliciting effort from a crowd are the peer based mechanisms, in which workers are paid by matching their answers with one another. The other classic mechanism is to have the workers solve some g ...

ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE2019

Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods

Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca

This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot inf ...

2019

Robust Multidimensional Pricing: Separation without Regret

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller endeavors to sell multiple goods to a single buyer, only knowing that the buyer's values for the goods range over a rectangular uncertainty set. We interpret this pr ...

2018

Exploring the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets * *This work is partially funded under M. Kamgarpour’s European Union ERC Starting Grant CONENE.

Maryam Kamgarpour

Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are procured through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determin ...

2017

Game theoretic analysis of electricity market auction mechanisms

Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca

We consider two prominent mechanisms for the electricity market; the pay-as-bid mechanism, currently applied in certain control reserve markets, and the proposed Vickrey- Clarke-Groves mechanism, an established auction mechanism used in advertising and spe ...

IEEE2017

Incentive Schemes for Participatory Sensing

Boi Faltings, Goran Radanovic

We consider a participatory sensing scenario where a group of private sensors observes the same phenomenon, such as air pollution. Since sensors need to be installed and maintained, owners of sensors are inclined to provide inaccurate or random data. We de ...

2015

Incentive Mechanisms for Community Sensing

Boi Faltings, Radu Jurca, Jingshi Li

Sensing and monitoring of our natural environment are important for sustainability. As sensor systems grow to a large scale, it will become infeasible to place all sensors under centralized control. We investigate community sensing, where sensors are contr ...

Ieee Computer Soc2014