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Concept
British World War II destroyers
Résumé
At the start of World War II, the Royal Navy operated a range of destroyer classes. Some of these were legacies of World War I, some were designed during the inter-war years and the rest were the result of wartime experience and conditions. British-built and -designed vessels were also supplied to and built by allied navies, primarily the Australian and Canadian navies.
British destroyer flotillas were formed from single classes, with a slightly adapted flotilla leader; the aim had been to produce a flotilla each year. As a broad summary, British destroyers developed from the successful s of World War I, increasing in complexity until World War II. The Royal Navy then needed new ships quickly to increase numbers, replace losses and exploit experience and so design became simplified and cheaper to produce, with greater anti-aircraft and anti-submarine power (War Emergency Programme).
British destroyer design had developed with incremental changes in the inter-war years, apart from the larger which was not repeated. In 1937, there was a radical change in destroyer design with the production of the more complex J, K and N classes and the modified Ls and Ms. It was deemed to be a successful design, but was discontinued in favour of the a simpler War Emergency Programme design.
Later in the war, the was developed, with a greatly enhanced anti-aircraft capability.
British practice had been to produce fleet destroyers and to relegate older vessels to escort duties. This was unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly, the fleet destroyers' power plants were designed for the higher speeds required of the naval fleet: they were inefficient when used for convoy speeds. Secondly, fleet destroyer range was inadequate and this was exacerbated at convoy speeds; significant adaptations were necessary. Thirdly, armament did not address the air and submarine threats to convoys and essential inclusions affected stability. Lastly, there were insufficient units and the urgent need was more for numbers rather than quality of build.
Source officielle
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