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In this paper we provide a novel and simple algorithm, Clairvoyant Multiplicative Weights Updates (CMWU), for convergence to \textit{Coarse Correlated Equilibria} (CCE) in general games. CMWU effectively corresponds to the standard MWU algorithm but where ...
We address online bandit learning of Nash equilibria in multi-agent convex games. We propose an algorithm whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at each joint played action, lacking any information of the functional form of her c ...
2021
This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classifier. While previous works usually al ...
In this paper we study a multi-channel network, each station of which is equipped with a network interface that has a receiver buffer of multiple packets. In this way, each station is able to receive multiple packets per time instant. We adopt a synchronou ...
2019
To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a "canonical extension," which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment meas ...
We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller endeavors to sell multiple goods to a single buyer, only knowing that the buyer's values for the goods range over a rectangular uncertainty set. We interpret this pr ...
2018
In this paper, we introduce a model of a financial market as a multiagent repeated game where the players are market makers. We formalize the concept of market making and the parameters of the game. Our main contribution is a framework that combines game t ...
2020
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We reconsider the training objective of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) from the mixed Nash Equilibria (NE) perspective. Inspired by the classical prox methods, we develop a novel algorithmic framework for GANs via an infinite-dimensional two-player ...
We consider the problem of learning to play a repeated multi-agent game with an unknown reward function. Single player online learning algorithms attain strong regret bounds when provided with full information feedback, which unfortunately is unavailable i ...
The celebrated Kelly betting strategy guarantees, with probability one, higher long-run wealth than any other causal investment strategy. However, on the way to its long-term supremacy, this strategy has a notable downfall: it typically displays high varia ...