Chaire du Prof. ordinaire Collin-Dufresne

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Publications associées (17)

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On Bounding Credit-Event Risk Premia

Pierre Collin Dufresne

Reduced-form models of default that attribute a large fraction of credit spreads to compensation for credit-event risk typically preclude the most plausible economic justification for such risk to be priced, namely, a contemporaneous drop in the market portfolio. When this “contagion” channel is introduced within a general equilibrium framework for an economy comprising a large number of firms, credit-event risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points, and are dwarfed by the contagion premium. We provide empirical evidence that indicates credit-event risk premia are less than 1 bp, but contagion risk premia are significant.

2015

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We investigate the impact of an exogenous trading glitch at a high-frequency market-making firm on standard measures of stock liquidity (spreads, price impact, turnover, and depth) and institutional trading costs (implementation shortfall and VWAP slippage). Stocks in which the firm accumulates large long (short) positions increase (decrease) by about 4% during the glitch and become substantially more illiquid. It takes one day for prices and spread-based liquidity measures to revert. Institutional trading costs, however, remain significantly higher for more than one week. Both liquidity measures are also weakly correlated outside the glitch period, suggesting they capture different aspects of liquidity.

2020

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Trading mechanisms in over-the-counter markets

Sebastian Vogel

In the chapter

When to Introduce Electronic Trading Platforms in Over-the-Counter Markets?'' An equilibrium in a market is determined in which traders have the choice between using an electronic platform with a request-for-quote protocol or calling a dealer directly. The main takeaway is that platforms increase the bargaining power of traders with search costs, thereby increasing their market participation and potentially also welfare. Another friction that affects trading in OTC markets are informational frictions. market participants may learn from trading activity on platforms and trade on that information in other trading venues. The interplay between an electronic trading platform in the dealer-to-customer market and the interdealer market is analysed in the chapter

Electronic Trading in OTC Markets vs. Centralized Exchange.'' In that chapter, a two-tiered OTC market is compared with a fully centralized market, showing that informed traders may prefer the two-tiered structure in order to benefit from their information. This ability of decentralized OTC markets to deal with asymmetric information is also a major benefit of OTC markets compared to exchange markets in welfare considerations. In the chapter ``Informed Traders and Dealers in the FX Forward Market,'' it is analyzed whether such informational frictions exist, whether dealers are able to mitigate those by charging different markups to different clients and whether we behavior consistent with the alleviation of informational frictions.

EPFL2020

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