Internet service provider | EPFL Graph Search

An Internet service provider (ISP) is an organization that provides services for accessing, using, managing, or participating in the Internet. ISPs can be organized in various forms, such as commercial, community-owned, non-profit, or otherwise privately owned. Internet services typically provided by ISPs can include Internet access, Internet transit, domain name registration, web hosting, Usenet service, and colocation. An ISP typically serves as the access point or the gateway that provides a user access to everything available on the Internet. Such a network can also be called as an eyeball network. History The Internet (originally ARPAnet) was developed as a network between government research laboratories and participating departments of universities. Other companies and organizations joined by direct connection to the backbone, or by arrangements through other connected companies, sometimes using dialup tools such as UUCP. By the late 1980s, a process was set in p

Game Theory in Communications

Vojislav Gajic

Multi-user communication theory typically studies the fundamental limits of communication systems, and considers communication schemes that approach or even achieve these limits. The functioning of many such schemes assumes that users always cooperate, even when it is not in their own best interest. In practice, this assumption need not be fulfilled, as rational communication participants are often only interested in maximizing their own communication experience, and may behave in an undesirable manner from the system's point of view. Thus, communication systems may operate differently than intended if the behavior of individual participants is not taken into account. In this thesis, we study how users make decisions in wireless settings, by considering their preferences and how they interact with each other. We investigate whether the outcomes of their decisions are desirable, and, if not, what can be done to improve them. In particular, we focus on two related issues. The first is the decision-making of communication users in the absence of any central authority, which we consider in the context of the Gaussian multiple access channel. The second is the pricing of wireless resources, which we consider in the context of the competition of wireless service providers for users who are not contractually tied to any provider, but free to choose the one offering the best tradeoff of parameters. In the first part of the thesis, we model the interaction of self-interested users in a Gaussian multiple access channel using non-cooperative game theory. We demonstrate that the lack of infrastructure leads to an inefficient outcome for users who interact only once, specifically due to the lack of coordination between users. Using evolutionary game theory, we show that this inefficient outcome would also arise as a result of repeated interaction of many individuals over time. On the other hand, if the users correlate their decoding schedule with the outcome of some publicly observed (pseudo) random variable, the resulting outcome is efficient. This shows that sometimes it takes very little intervention on the part of the system planner to make sure that users choose a desirable operating point. In the second part of the thesis, we consider the competition of wireless service providers for users who are free to choose their service provider based on their channel parameters and the resource price. We model this situation as a two-stage game where the providers announce unit resource prices in the first stage and the users choose how much resource they want to purchase from each provider in the second stage. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the competitive interaction of users and providers results in socially optimal resource allocation. We also provide a decentralized primal-dual algorithm and prove its convergence to the socially optimal outcome.

EPFL2010

Rethinking Location Privacy for Unknown Mobility Behaviors

Carmela González Troncoso, Simón Oya Diez

Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) in the literature largely consider that users' data available for training wholly characterizes their mobility patterns. Thus, they hardwire this information in their designs and evaluate their privacy properties with these same data. In this paper, we aim to understand the impact of this decision on the level of privacy these LPPMs may offer in real life when the users' mobility data may be different from the data used in the design phase. Our results show that, in many cases, training data does not capture users' behavior accurately and, thus, the level of privacy provided by the LPPM is often overestimated. To address this gap between theory and practice, we propose to use blank-slate models for LPPM design. Contrary to the hardwired approach, that assumes known users' behavior, blank-slate models learn the users' behavior from the queries to the service provider. We leverage this blank-slate approach to develop a new family of LPPMs, that we call Profile Estimation-Based LPPMs. Using real data, we empirically show that our proposal outperforms optimal state-of-the-art mechanisms designed on sporadic hardwired models. On non-sporadic location privacy scenarios, our method is only better if the usage of the location privacy service is not continuous. It is our hope that eliminating the need to bootstrap the mechanisms with training data and ensuring that the mechanisms are lightweight and easy to compute help fostering the integration of location privacy protections in deployed systems.

IEEE COMPUTER SOC2019

An Accountability Interface for the Internet

Olga Irzak

The Internet provides no information on the fate of transmitted packets, and end systems cannot determine who is responsible for dropping or delaying their traffic. As a result, they cannot verify that their ISPs are honoring their service level agreements, nor can they react to adverse network conditions appropriately. While current probing tools provide some assistance in this regard, they only give feedback on probes, not actual traffic. Moreover, service providers could, at any time, render their network opaque to such tools. We propose an explicit accountability interface, through which ISPs can pro-actively supply feedback to traffic sources on loss and delay, at administrative-domain granularity. Notably, our interface is resistant to ISP lies and can be implemented with a modest NetFlow modification. On our Click-based prototype, playback of real traces from a Tier-1 ISP reveals less than 2% bandwidth overhead. Finally, our proposal benefits not only end systems, but also ISPs, who can now control the amount and quality of information revealed about their internals.

2007

Game Theory in Communications

Vojislav Gajic

EPFL2010