Intermediate logicIn mathematical logic, a superintuitionistic logic is a propositional logic extending intuitionistic logic. Classical logic is the strongest consistent superintuitionistic logic; thus, consistent superintuitionistic logics are called intermediate logics (the logics are intermediate between intuitionistic logic and classical logic). A superintuitionistic logic is a set L of propositional formulas in a countable set of variables pi satisfying the following properties: 1. all axioms of intuitionistic logic belong to L; 2.
Proof netIn proof theory, proof nets are a geometrical method of representing proofs that eliminates two forms of bureaucracy that differentiate proofs: (A) irrelevant syntactical features of regular proof calculi, and (B) the order of rules applied in a derivation. In this way, the formal properties of proof identity correspond more closely to the intuitively desirable properties. Proof nets were introduced by Jean-Yves Girard. This distinguishes proof nets from regular proof calculi such as the natural deduction calculus and the sequent calculus, where these phenomena are present.
Admissible ruleIn logic, a rule of inference is admissible in a formal system if the set of theorems of the system does not change when that rule is added to the existing rules of the system. In other words, every formula that can be derived using that rule is already derivable without that rule, so, in a sense, it is redundant. The concept of an admissible rule was introduced by Paul Lorenzen (1955). Admissibility has been systematically studied only in the case of structural (i.e.
Conservative extensionIn mathematical logic, a conservative extension is a supertheory of a theory which is often convenient for proving theorems, but proves no new theorems about the language of the original theory. Similarly, a non-conservative extension is a supertheory which is not conservative, and can prove more theorems than the original. More formally stated, a theory is a (proof theoretic) conservative extension of a theory if every theorem of is a theorem of , and any theorem of in the language of is already a theorem of .
MetatheoremIn logic, a metatheorem is a statement about a formal system proven in a metalanguage. Unlike theorems proved within a given formal system, a metatheorem is proved within a metatheory, and may reference concepts that are present in the metatheory but not the object theory. A formal system is determined by a formal language and a deductive system (axioms and rules of inference). The formal system can be used to prove particular sentences of the formal language with that system.
Provability logicProvability logic is a modal logic, in which the box (or "necessity") operator is interpreted as 'it is provable that'. The point is to capture the notion of a proof predicate of a reasonably rich formal theory, such as Peano arithmetic. There are a number of provability logics, some of which are covered in the literature mentioned in . The basic system is generally referred to as GL (for Gödel–Löb) or L or K4W (W stands for well-foundedness). It can be obtained by adding the modal version of Löb's theorem to the logic K (or K4).
LudicsIn proof theory, ludics is an analysis of the principles governing inference rules of mathematical logic. Key features of ludics include notion of compound connectives, using a technique known as focusing or focalisation (invented by the computer scientist Jean-Marc Andreoli), and its use of locations or loci over a base instead of propositions. More precisely, ludics tries to retrieve known logical connectives and proof behaviours by following the paradigm of interactive computation, similarly to what is done in game semantics to which it is closely related.
