Proof calculusIn mathematical logic, a proof calculus or a proof system is built to prove statements. A proof system includes the components: Language: The set L of formulas admitted by the system, for example, propositional logic or first-order logic. Rules of inference: List of rules that can be employed to prove theorems from axioms and theorems. Axioms: Formulas in L assumed to be valid. All theorems are derived from axioms. Usually a given proof calculus encompasses more than a single particular formal system, since many proof calculi are under-determined and can be used for radically different logics.
Ordinal analysisIn proof theory, ordinal analysis assigns ordinals (often large countable ordinals) to mathematical theories as a measure of their strength. If theories have the same proof-theoretic ordinal they are often equiconsistent, and if one theory has a larger proof-theoretic ordinal than another it can often prove the consistency of the second theory. The field of ordinal analysis was formed when Gerhard Gentzen in 1934 used cut elimination to prove, in modern terms, that the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic is ε0.
Diagonal lemmaIn mathematical logic, the diagonal lemma (also known as diagonalization lemma, self-reference lemma or fixed point theorem) establishes the existence of self-referential sentences in certain formal theories of the natural numbers—specifically those theories that are strong enough to represent all computable functions. The sentences whose existence is secured by the diagonal lemma can then, in turn, be used to prove fundamental limitative results such as Gödel's incompleteness theorems and Tarski's undefinability theorem.
Ω-consistent theoryIn mathematical logic, an ω-consistent (or omega-consistent, also called numerically segregative) theory is a theory (collection of sentences) that is not only (syntactically) consistent (that is, does not prove a contradiction), but also avoids proving certain infinite combinations of sentences that are intuitively contradictory. The name is due to Kurt Gödel, who introduced the concept in the course of proving the incompleteness theorem.
Hilbert's programIn mathematics, Hilbert's program, formulated by German mathematician David Hilbert in the early 1920s, was a proposed solution to the foundational crisis of mathematics, when early attempts to clarify the foundations of mathematics were found to suffer from paradoxes and inconsistencies. As a solution, Hilbert proposed to ground all existing theories to a finite, complete set of axioms, and provide a proof that these axioms were consistent.
SequentIn mathematical logic, a sequent is a very general kind of conditional assertion. A sequent may have any number m of condition formulas Ai (called "antecedents") and any number n of asserted formulas Bj (called "succedents" or "consequents"). A sequent is understood to mean that if all of the antecedent conditions are true, then at least one of the consequent formulas is true. This style of conditional assertion is almost always associated with the conceptual framework of sequent calculus.
Primitive recursive arithmeticPrimitive recursive arithmetic (PRA) is a quantifier-free formalization of the natural numbers. It was first proposed by Norwegian mathematician , as a formalization of his finitistic conception of the foundations of arithmetic, and it is widely agreed that all reasoning of PRA is finitistic. Many also believe that all of finitism is captured by PRA, but others believe finitism can be extended to forms of recursion beyond primitive recursion, up to ε0, which is the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic.
Dialectica interpretationIn proof theory, the Dialectica interpretation is a proof interpretation of intuitionistic logic (Heyting arithmetic) into a finite type extension of primitive recursive arithmetic, the so-called System T. It was developed by Kurt Gödel to provide a consistency proof of arithmetic. The name of the interpretation comes from the journal Dialectica, where Gödel's paper was published in a 1958 special issue dedicated to Paul Bernays on his 70th birthday.
Atomic formulaIn mathematical logic, an atomic formula (also known as an atom or a prime formula) is a formula with no deeper propositional structure, that is, a formula that contains no logical connectives or equivalently a formula that has no strict subformulas. Atoms are thus the simplest well-formed formulas of the logic. Compound formulas are formed by combining the atomic formulas using the logical connectives.
Structural ruleIn proof theory, a structural rule is an inference rule that does not refer to any logical connective, but instead operates on the judgment or sequents directly. Structural rules often mimic intended meta-theoretic properties of the logic. Logics that deny one or more of the structural rules are classified as substructural logics. Three common structural rules are: Weakening, where the hypotheses or conclusion of a sequent may be extended with additional members.
