NormativityNormative generally means relating to an evaluative standard. Normativity is the phenomenon in human societies of designating some actions or outcomes as good, desirable, or permissible, and others as bad, undesirable, or impermissible. A norm in this sense means a standard for evaluating or making judgments about behavior or outcomes. "Normative" is sometimes also used, somewhat confusingly, to mean relating to a descriptive standard: doing what is normally done or what most others are expected to do in practice.
Fact–value distinctionThe fact–value distinction is a fundamental epistemological distinction described between: Statements of fact (positive or descriptive statements), based upon reason and physical observation, and which are examined via the empirical method. Statements of value (normative or prescriptive statements), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology. This barrier between fact and value, as construed in epistemology, implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter.
Norm (philosophy)Norms are concepts (sentences) of practical import, oriented to affecting an action, rather than conceptual abstractions that describe, explain, and express. Normative sentences imply "ought-to" types of statements and assertions, in distinction to sentences that provide "is" types of statements and assertions. Common normative sentences include commands, permissions, and prohibitions; common normative abstract concepts include sincerity, justification, and honesty.
Ethical naturalismEthical naturalism (also called moral naturalism or naturalistic cognitivistic definism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that: Ethical sentences express propositions. Some such propositions are true. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world. These moral features of the world are reducible to some set of non-moral features. The versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell realism, differ from the position that "the way things are is always the way they ought to be", which few ethical naturalists hold.
Naturalistic fallacyIn philosophical ethics, the naturalistic fallacy is the claim that it is possible to give a reductive explanation of good, in terms of natural properties such as pleasant or desirable. The term was introduced by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica. Moore's naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the is–ought problem, which comes from David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40). However, unlike Hume's view of the is–ought problem, Moore (and other proponents of ethical non-naturalism) did not consider the naturalistic fallacy to be at odds with moral realism.
Normative statementIn many disciplines, including economics and philosophy, a normative statement expresses a value judgment about the desirability of a situation. Whereas a descriptive statement (also known as a positive statement) is meant to describe the world as it is, a normative statement is meant to talk about the world as it should be. For instance, "the world would be a better place if the moon were made of green cheese" is a normative statement because it expresses a judgment about what ought to be.
Appeal to natureAn appeal to nature is an argument or rhetorical tactic in which it is proposed that "a thing is good because it is 'natural', or bad because it is 'unnatural. It is generally considered to be a bad argument because the implicit (unstated) primary premise "What is natural is good" is typically irrelevant, having no cogent meaning in practice, or is an opinion instead of a fact. For example, it might be argued that polio is good because it is natural.
Nicomachean EthicsThe Nicomachean Ethics (ˌnaɪkɒməˈkiən; ˌnɪkəməˈkiən; Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια, Ēthika Nikomacheia) is Aristotle's best-known work on ethics: the science of the good for human life, that which is the goal or end at which all our actions aim. It consists of ten subsections, referred to as books or scrolls, and is closely related to Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics. The work plays a pre-eminent role in explaining Aristotelian ethics. The theme of the work is a Socratic question previously explored in the works of Plato, Aristotle's friend and teacher, about how men should best live.
Non-cognitivismNon-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt). A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world". If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible.
MetaethicsIn metaphilosophy and ethics, metaethics is the study of the nature, scope, and meaning of moral judgment. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought to be and act) and applied ethics (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations).
