Diophantine setIn mathematics, a Diophantine equation is an equation of the form P(x1, ..., xj, y1, ..., yk) = 0 (usually abbreviated P(, ) = 0) where P(, ) is a polynomial with integer coefficients, where x1, ..., xj indicate parameters and y1, ..., yk indicate unknowns. A Diophantine set is a subset S of , the set of all j-tuples of natural numbers, so that for some Diophantine equation P(, ) = 0, That is, a parameter value is in the Diophantine set S if and only if the associated Diophantine equation is satisfiable under that parameter value.
Hilbert's second problemIn mathematics, Hilbert's second problem was posed by David Hilbert in 1900 as one of his 23 problems. It asks for a proof that the arithmetic is consistent – free of any internal contradictions. Hilbert stated that the axioms he considered for arithmetic were the ones given in , which include a second order completeness axiom. In the 1930s, Kurt Gödel and Gerhard Gentzen proved results that cast new light on the problem. Some feel that Gödel's theorems give a negative solution to the problem, while others consider Gentzen's proof as a partial positive solution.
Isabelle (proof assistant)The Isabelle automated theorem prover is a higher-order logic (HOL) theorem prover, written in Standard ML and Scala. As an LCF-style theorem prover, it is based on a small logical core (kernel) to increase the trustworthiness of proofs without requiring yet supporting explicit proof objects. Isabelle is available inside a flexible system framework allowing for logically safe extensions, which comprise both theories as well as implementations for code-generation, documentation, and specific support for a variety of formal methods.
DialetheismDialetheism (from Greek δι- 'twice' and ἀλήθεια 'truth') is the view that there are statements that are both true and false. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called "true contradictions", dialetheia, or nondualisms. Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis about truth that influences the construction of a formal logic, often based on pre-existing systems.
Richard's paradoxIn logic, Richard's paradox is a semantical antinomy of set theory and natural language first described by the French mathematician Jules Richard in 1905. The paradox is ordinarily used to motivate the importance of distinguishing carefully between mathematics and metamathematics. Kurt Gödel specifically cites Richard's antinomy as a semantical analogue to his syntactical incompleteness result in the introductory section of "On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I".
Kruskal's tree theoremIn mathematics, Kruskal's tree theorem states that the set of finite trees over a well-quasi-ordered set of labels is itself well-quasi-ordered under homeomorphic embedding. The theorem was conjectured by Andrew Vázsonyi and proved by ; a short proof was given by . It has since become a prominent example in reverse mathematics as a statement that cannot be proved in ATR0 (a second-order arithmetic theory with a form of arithmetical transfinite recursion).
Dense orderIn mathematics, a partial order or total order < on a set is said to be dense if, for all and in for which , there is a in such that . That is, for any two elements, one less than the other, there is another element between them. For total orders this can be simplified to "for any two distinct elements, there is another element between them", since all elements of a total order are comparable. The rational numbers as a linearly ordered set are a densely ordered set in this sense, as are the algebraic numbers, the real numbers, the dyadic rationals and the decimal fractions.
Tennenbaum's theoremTennenbaum's theorem, named for Stanley Tennenbaum who presented the theorem in 1959, is a result in mathematical logic that states that no countable nonstandard model of first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) can be recursive (Kaye 1991:153ff). A structure in the language of PA is recursive if there are recursive functions and from to , a recursive two-place relation
Provability logicProvability logic is a modal logic, in which the box (or "necessity") operator is interpreted as 'it is provable that'. The point is to capture the notion of a proof predicate of a reasonably rich formal theory, such as Peano arithmetic. There are a number of provability logics, some of which are covered in the literature mentioned in . The basic system is generally referred to as GL (for Gödel–Löb) or L or K4W (W stands for well-foundedness). It can be obtained by adding the modal version of Löb's theorem to the logic K (or K4).
Independence (mathematical logic)In mathematical logic, independence is the unprovability of a sentence from other sentences. A sentence σ is independent of a given first-order theory T if T neither proves nor refutes σ; that is, it is impossible to prove σ from T, and it is also impossible to prove from T that σ is false. Sometimes, σ is said (synonymously) to be undecidable from T; this is not the same meaning of "decidability" as in a decision problem. A theory T is independent if each axiom in T is not provable from the remaining axioms in T.
