Principle of explosionIn classical logic, intuitionistic logic and similar logical systems, the principle of explosion (ex falso [sequitur] quodlibet, 'from falsehood, anything [follows]'; or ex contradictione [sequitur] quodlibet), or the principle of Pseudo-Scotus (falsely attributed to Duns Scotus), is the law according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction. That is, from a contradiction, any proposition (including its negation) can be inferred from it; this is known as deductive explosion.
Independence (mathematical logic)In mathematical logic, independence is the unprovability of a sentence from other sentences. A sentence σ is independent of a given first-order theory T if T neither proves nor refutes σ; that is, it is impossible to prove σ from T, and it is also impossible to prove from T that σ is false. Sometimes, σ is said (synonymously) to be undecidable from T; this is not the same meaning of "decidability" as in a decision problem. A theory T is independent if each axiom in T is not provable from the remaining axioms in T.
SatisfiabilityIn mathematical logic, a formula is satisfiable if it is true under some assignment of values to its variables. For example, the formula is satisfiable because it is true when and , while the formula is not satisfiable over the integers. The dual concept to satisfiability is validity; a formula is valid if every assignment of values to its variables makes the formula true. For example, is valid over the integers, but is not.
Term (logic)In mathematical logic, a term denotes a mathematical object while a formula denotes a mathematical fact. In particular, terms appear as components of a formula. This is analogous to natural language, where a noun phrase refers to an object and a whole sentence refers to a fact. A first-order term is recursively constructed from constant symbols, variables and function symbols. An expression formed by applying a predicate symbol to an appropriate number of terms is called an atomic formula, which evaluates to true or false in bivalent logics, given an interpretation.
Gödel's completeness theoremGödel's completeness theorem is a fundamental theorem in mathematical logic that establishes a correspondence between semantic truth and syntactic provability in first-order logic. The completeness theorem applies to any first-order theory: If T is such a theory, and φ is a sentence (in the same language) and every model of T is a model of φ, then there is a (first-order) proof of φ using the statements of T as axioms. One sometimes says this as "anything universally true is provable".
Diophantine setIn mathematics, a Diophantine equation is an equation of the form P(x1, ..., xj, y1, ..., yk) = 0 (usually abbreviated P(, ) = 0) where P(, ) is a polynomial with integer coefficients, where x1, ..., xj indicate parameters and y1, ..., yk indicate unknowns. A Diophantine set is a subset S of , the set of all j-tuples of natural numbers, so that for some Diophantine equation P(, ) = 0, That is, a parameter value is in the Diophantine set S if and only if the associated Diophantine equation is satisfiable under that parameter value.
Ω-consistent theoryIn mathematical logic, an ω-consistent (or omega-consistent, also called numerically segregative) theory is a theory (collection of sentences) that is not only (syntactically) consistent (that is, does not prove a contradiction), but also avoids proving certain infinite combinations of sentences that are intuitively contradictory. The name is due to Kurt Gödel, who introduced the concept in the course of proving the incompleteness theorem.
Substitution (logic)A substitution is a syntactic transformation on formal expressions. To apply a substitution to an expression means to consistently replace its variable, or placeholder, symbols with other expressions. The resulting expression is called a substitution instance, or instance for short, of the original expression. Where ψ and φ represent formulas of propositional logic, ψ is a substitution instance of φ if and only if ψ may be obtained from φ by substituting formulas for symbols in φ, replacing each occurrence of the same symbol by an occurrence of the same formula.
Primitive recursive arithmeticPrimitive recursive arithmetic (PRA) is a quantifier-free formalization of the natural numbers. It was first proposed by Norwegian mathematician , as a formalization of his finitistic conception of the foundations of arithmetic, and it is widely agreed that all reasoning of PRA is finitistic. Many also believe that all of finitism is captured by PRA, but others believe finitism can be extended to forms of recursion beyond primitive recursion, up to ε0, which is the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic.
Hilbert's second problemIn mathematics, Hilbert's second problem was posed by David Hilbert in 1900 as one of his 23 problems. It asks for a proof that the arithmetic is consistent – free of any internal contradictions. Hilbert stated that the axioms he considered for arithmetic were the ones given in , which include a second order completeness axiom. In the 1930s, Kurt Gödel and Gerhard Gentzen proved results that cast new light on the problem. Some feel that Gödel's theorems give a negative solution to the problem, while others consider Gentzen's proof as a partial positive solution.
