EquiconsistencyIn mathematical logic, two theories are equiconsistent if the consistency of one theory implies the consistency of the other theory, and vice versa. In this case, they are, roughly speaking, "as consistent as each other". In general, it is not possible to prove the absolute consistency of a theory T. Instead we usually take a theory S, believed to be consistent, and try to prove the weaker statement that if S is consistent then T must also be consistent—if we can do this we say that T is consistent relative to S.
Intermediate logicIn mathematical logic, a superintuitionistic logic is a propositional logic extending intuitionistic logic. Classical logic is the strongest consistent superintuitionistic logic; thus, consistent superintuitionistic logics are called intermediate logics (the logics are intermediate between intuitionistic logic and classical logic). A superintuitionistic logic is a set L of propositional formulas in a countable set of variables pi satisfying the following properties: 1. all axioms of intuitionistic logic belong to L; 2.
Cut-elimination theoremThe cut-elimination theorem (or Gentzen's Hauptsatz) is the central result establishing the significance of the sequent calculus. It was originally proved by Gerhard Gentzen in his landmark 1934 paper "Investigations in Logical Deduction" for the systems LJ and LK formalising intuitionistic and classical logic respectively. The cut-elimination theorem states that any judgement that possesses a proof in the sequent calculus making use of the cut rule also possesses a cut-free proof, that is, a proof that does not make use of the cut rule.
Signature (logic)In logic, especially mathematical logic, a signature lists and describes the non-logical symbols of a formal language. In universal algebra, a signature lists the operations that characterize an algebraic structure. In model theory, signatures are used for both purposes. They are rarely made explicit in more philosophical treatments of logic.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems"Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I" ("On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I") is a paper in mathematical logic by Kurt Gödel. Submitted November 17, 1930, it was originally published in German in the 1931 volume of Monatshefte für Mathematik. Several English translations have appeared in print, and the paper has been included in two collections of classic mathematical logic papers.
Complete theoryIn mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula or its negation is provable. That is, for every sentence the theory contains the sentence or its negation but not both (that is, either or ). Recursively axiomatizable first-order theories that are consistent and rich enough to allow general mathematical reasoning to be formulated cannot be complete, as demonstrated by Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
Self-verifying theoriesSelf-verifying theories are consistent first-order systems of arithmetic, much weaker than Peano arithmetic, that are capable of proving their own consistency. Dan Willard was the first to investigate their properties, and he has described a family of such systems. According to Gödel's incompleteness theorem, these systems cannot contain the theory of Peano arithmetic nor its weak fragment Robinson arithmetic; nonetheless, they can contain strong theorems.
Admissible ruleIn logic, a rule of inference is admissible in a formal system if the set of theorems of the system does not change when that rule is added to the existing rules of the system. In other words, every formula that can be derived using that rule is already derivable without that rule, so, in a sense, it is redundant. The concept of an admissible rule was introduced by Paul Lorenzen (1955). Admissibility has been systematically studied only in the case of structural (i.e.
