Borne Wi-Fi

Résumé

Une borne Wi-Fi, un point (d'accès) Wi-Fi (Access Point : AP) ou bien un hotspot, est un matériel qui donne accès à un réseau sans fil Wi-Fi permettant aux utilisateurs de téléphones mobiles, de tablettes tactiles ou d'ordinateurs portables de se connecter à Internet. L'accès ainsi fourni peut être gratuit ou payant pour l'utilisateur. Des annuaires de zones d'accès sans fil sont disponibles en ligne afin de faciliter la recherche de ces bornes partout dans le monde. Historique Le premier point Wi-Fi fut présenté pour la première fois par Brett Stewart à la conférence NetWorld+Interop au Moscone Center à San Francisco en . À l'époque, Stewart parlait non pas de hotspot mais d'accès public sans fil à des LANs (réseaux locaux). Par la suite, en 1994, il fonda la société PLANCOM (pour Public LAN Communications). En 2012, l'emploi d'êtres humains SDF comme bornes mobiles Wi-Fi pour le festival SXSW de Austin (Texas) soulève la polémique. Industrie L'industri

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borne_Wi-Fi

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2012

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Location privacy has been extensively studied over the last few years, especially in the context of location-based services where users purposely disclose their location to benefit from convenient context-aware services. To date, however, little attention has been devoted to the case of users' location being unintentionally compromised by others. In this paper, we study a concrete and widespread example of such situations, specifically the location-privacy threat created by access points (e.g., public hotspots) using network address translation (NAT). Indeed, because users connected to the same hotspot share a unique public IP, a single user making a location-based request is enough to enable a service provider to map the IP of the hotspot to its geographic coordinates, thus compromising the location privacy of all the other connected users. When successful, the service provider can locate users within a few hundreds of meters, thus improving over existing IP-location databases. Even in the case where IPs change periodically (e.g., by using DHCP), the service provider is still able to update a previous (IP, Location) mapping by inferring IP changes from authenticated communications (e.g., cookies). The contribution of this paper is three-fold: (i) We identify a novel threat to users' location privacy caused by the use of shared public IPs. (ii) We formalize and analyze theoretically the threat. The resulting framework can be applied to any access-point to quantify the privacy threat. (iii) We experimentally assess the state in practice by using real traces of users accessing Google services, collected from deployed hotspots. Also, we discuss how existing countermeasures can thwart the threat.

2013

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A Location-Privacy Threat Stemming from the Use of Shared Public IP Addresses

Vincent Bindschaedler, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Kévin Clément Huguenin, Nevena Vratonjic

This paper presents a concrete and widespread example of situation where a user’s location privacy is unintentionally compromised by others, specifically the location-privacy threat that exists at access points (public hotspots, FON, home routers, etc.) that have a single public IP and make use of network address translation (NAT). As users connected to the same hotspot share a unique public IP address, a single user’s making a location-based request is enough to enable a service provider to map the IP address of the hotspot to its geographic coordinates, thus compromising the location privacy of all the other connected users. When successful, the service provider can locate users within a few hundreds of meters, thus improving over existing IP-location databases. Even in the case where IPs change periodically (e.g., by using DHCP), the service provider is still able to update a previous (IP, Location) mapping by inferring IP changes from authenticated communications (e.g., cookies). The contribution of this paper is three-fold: (i) We identify a novel location-privacy threat caused by shared public IPs in combination with NAT. (ii) We formalize and analyze the threat theoretically. In particular we derive and provide expressions of the probability that the service provider will learn the mapping and of the expected proportion of victims. (iii) We experimentally assess the state in practice by using real traces (collected from deployed hotspots over a period of 23 days) of users who accessed Google services. We also discuss how existing countermeasures can thwart the threat.

Ieee Computer Soc2014

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