Marché secondaire | EPFL Graph Search

Le marché secondaire est le marché financier où les agents économiques peuvent acheter et vendre des actifs financiers déjà existants. Il s'agit d'un , contrairement au marché primaire, qui est un marché de neuf. Concept Les marchés secondaires sont des marchés où s'échangent des actifs financiers déjà émis et achetés une première fois. Il s'agit à ce titre d'un marché d'occasion, où un actif change de main. Les marchés secondaires comportent à la fois un segment organisé (la bourse), et un segment de gré à gré (marchés privés, over-the-counter). On peut acheter sur les marchés secondaires des instruments financiers comme des actions, des obligations, des options et des contrats à terme. Ces instruments ont déjà été émis et achetés une première fois sur le marché primaire. Toute revente se fait sur les marchés secondaires. Le cours de chaque instrument sur les marchés secondaires fluctue selon l'offre et la demande sur ce marché. La valeur des titres peut ainsi s'écar

Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance

Francesca Maria Zucchi

This thesis examines the effects of financing frictions on corporate decisions using dynamic models. Accounting for financing frictions helps reconcile a number of regularities that are hard to explain within the Modigliani-Miller framework. For instance, financing frictions provide incentives for firms to keep liquidity on their balance sheets as a precautionary hedge---a pattern that has been heavily debated in light of the secular increase of cash-to-asset ratios of U.S. firms. The first chapter develops a model that investigates the relation between corporate policies and secondary stock market liquidity. I show that secondary market illiquidity limits a firm's ability to hold precautionary liquidity, exacerbates financial constraints, reduces investment, and decreases firm value. The model reproduces the positive relation between market liquidity and corporate cash holdings observed in the data. This relation might be surprising since firms with illiquid stocks, which have been documented to be more financially constrained than more liquid peers, should be willing to keep more precautionary cash. I also show that the illiquidity-driven drop in firm value can feed back into the secondary market by deterring the participation of liquidity providers, thereby making the market more illiquid. The self-reinforcing nature of this relation gives rise to an internal-external liquidity loop, which singles out a propagation mechanism between financial markets and the corporate sector. From a banking perspective, liquidity hoarding has been a hotly debated topic among academics and policy-makers in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The second chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Erwan Morellec and Marco Della Seta, develops a dynamic model of the effects of liability structure and liquid reserves on banks' insolvency risk. When a bank relies on short-term debt financing, negative operating shocks get amplified as the bank weaker fundamentals also translate into losses when rolling over short-term debt. This amplification mechanism leads to an increase in default risk that gets more pronounced as debt maturity decreases and rollover losses increase. Because of this amplification mechanism, banks with identical debt ratios and liquid reserves but different debt structures have different default risk. Heavy exposure to rollover risk can also lead banks to implement gambling strategies when close to default. The third chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Semyon Malamud, analyzes firms' optimal policies in a general equilibrium setting. It characterizes optimal liquidity management, innovation, and production decisions for a continuum of firms facing financing frictions and the threat of creative destruction. We show that liquidity constraints lead firms to cut production and increase markups, which are then countercyclical with respect to firm-specific shocks. We also illustrate that liquidity constraints may spur firms' investment in innovation and give rise to a non-monotonic cash-investment relation. We embed our single-firm dynamics in a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth and demonstrate that financing frictions have a non-monotonic effect on economic growth and may increase aggregate consumption. When the corporate sector is constrained, liquidity injections by the government have real effects and can stimulate growth.

EPFL2015

Strategic Durability with Sharing Markets

Maryam Razeghian Jahromi, Thomas Alois Weber

Electronic sharing markets are contributing to a paradigm shift, from consuming products to accessing products. This paper studies the effects of sharing markets on the prices for new products and on product design in terms of durability. In a dynamic economy with overlapping generations, consumers take strategic purchasing decisions, anticipated by a durable-goods monopolist. Without sharing, the optimal durability increases in the production cost. For low-cost products, a producer prefers to limit durability, effectively disabling a secondary sharing market. The presence of sharing never decreases the incentives to provide durability thus contributing to sustainable product design.

2019

Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage

Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. We show that the FRM market share is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods in which private securitization markets are well functioning.

2015

Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance

Francesca Maria Zucchi

EPFL2015