Judicial restraint is a judicial interpretation that recommends favoring the status quo in judicial activities and is the opposite of judicial activism. Aspects of judicial restraint include the principle of stare decisis (that new decisions should be consistent with previous decisions); a conservative approach to standing and a reluctance to grant certiorari; and a tendency to deliver narrowly tailored verdicts, avoiding "unnecessary resolution of broad questions."
Judicial restraint may lead a court to avoid hearing a case in the first place. The court may justify its decision by questioning whether the plaintiff has standing; or by refusing to grant certiorari; or by determining that the central issue of the case is a political question better decided by the executive or legislative branches of government; or by determining that the court has no jurisdiction in the matter.
Judicial restraint may lead a court to decide in favor of the status quo. In a case of judicial review, this may mean refusing to overturn an existing law unless the law is flagrantly unconstitutional (though what counts as "flagrantly unconstitutional" is itself a matter of some debate). On an appeal, restraint may mean refusing to overturn the lower court's ruling. In general, restraint may mean respecting the principle of stare decisis — that new decisions should show "respect [...] for its own previous decisions."
Judicial restraint may lead a court to rule narrowly, avoiding "unnecessary resolution of broad questions" (also known as judicial minimalism). Restrained rulings are small and case-specific, rather than broad and sweeping. Restrained rulings also hesitate to justify themselves in terms of previously unidentified rights or principles.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote:
A constitutional case involving stare decisis was South Carolina v. Gathers. In Gathers the Court was urged to reconsider Booth v. Maryland.... [In an example of judicial restraint,] Justice White, who had dissented in the Booth case, declined to overrule it.
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Le gouvernement des juges est une expression du professeur de droit Édouard Lambert, apparue pour la première fois dans son ouvrage Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux États-Unis (1921), et qui désigne le fait pour un juge de privilégier son interprétation personnelle au détriment de la lettre de la loi. Dans un sens plus large, la notion de « gouvernement des juges » est une critique d'une tendance occidentale actuelle qui consiste à laisser au judiciaire des décisions qui "devraient normalement relever du politique".
L'interprétation des lois est la branche du droit qui examine les règles d'interprétation textuelle des textes de loi. Règle du sens ordinaire Approche téléologique Stéphane Beaulac et Frédéric Bérard, Précis d'interprétation législative, 2e édition, Montréal: LexisNexis Canada, 2014. Pierre-André Côté, avec la collaboration de Stéphane Beaulac et Mathieu Devinat, 4e édition, Interprétation des lois. Montréal : Éditions Thémis, 2009. Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th Edition, Toronto : LexiNexis Canada, 2014 Elmer Driedger, The Construction of Statutes.
Judicial interpretation is the way in which the judiciary construes the law, particularly constitutional documents, legislation and frequently used vocabulary. This is an important issue in some common law jurisdictions such as the United States, Australia and Canada, because the supreme courts of those nations can overturn laws made by their legislatures via a process called judicial review.