Concept
Méthode de Condorcet
Concepts associés (33)
Ensemble de Smith
Dans les systèmes de vote, l'ensemble de Smith, nommé d'après John H. Smith, mais également connu sous le nom de cycle supérieur, ou comme GETCHA (Generalized Top-Choice Assumption en anglais), est le plus petit ensemble non vide de candidats dans une élection particulière de telle sorte que chaque membre bat chaque candidat en dehors de l'ensemble lors d'une élection par paires. L'ensemble de Smith fournit une norme de choix optimal pour un résultat électoral.
Vote utile
Le vote utile est le fait de voter pour un candidat ayant supposément plus de chances d'être élu plutôt que pour celui que l'on préfère. Ce phénomène aurait pour effet d'empêcher un candidat tiers de remporter l'élection. C'est un type de vote stratégique. Le vote utile consiste à renoncer à son vote de cœur pour préférer un candidat qui paraît à la fois plus susceptible de gagner et le moins éloigné de ses préférences politiques.
Smith criterion
The Smith criterion (sometimes generalized Condorcet criterion, but this can have other meanings) is a voting systems criterion defined such that it's satisfied when a voting system always elects a candidate that is in the Smith set, which is the smallest non-empty subset of the candidates such that every candidate in the subset is majority-preferred over every candidate not in the subset. (A candidate X is said to be majority-preferred over another candidate Y if, in a one-on-one competition between X & Y, the number of voters who prefer X over Y exceeds the number of voters who prefer Y over X.
Nanson's method
The Borda count electoral system can be combined with an instant-runoff procedure to create hybrid election methods that are called Nanson method and Baldwin method (also called Total Vote Runoff or TVR). Both methods are designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, and allow for incomplete ballots and equal rankings. The Nanson method is based on the original work of the mathematician Edward J. Nanson in 1882.
Méthode de Copeland
La méthode de Copeland ou la méthode d'agrégation par paires de Copeland est une méthode Condorcet, dans laquelle les candidats sont classés par le nombre de victoires par paires, moins le nombre de défaites par paires. Elle satisfait le critère de Smith. Elle a été inventée par Ramon Llull dans son traité Ars Electionis de 1299, mais sa forme ne comptait que les victoires par paires et non les défaites (ce qui pourrait conduire à un résultat différent en cas d'égalité par paires).
Bucklin voting
Bucklin voting is a class of voting methods that can be used for single-member and multi-member districts. As in highest median rules like the majority judgment, the Bucklin winner will be one of the candidates with the highest median ranking or rating. It is named after its original promoter, the Georgist politician James W. Bucklin of Grand Junction, Colorado, and is also known as the Grand Junction system. Bucklin rules varied, but here is a typical example: Voters are allowed rank preference ballots (first, second, third, etc.
Independence of clones criterion
In voting systems theory, the independence of clones criterion measures an election method's robustness to strategic nomination. Nicolaus Tideman was the first to formulate this criterion, which states that the winner must not change due to the addition of a non-winning candidate who is similar to a candidate already present. To be more precise, a subset of the candidates, called a set of clones, exists if no voter ranks any candidate outside the set between (or equal to) any candidates that are in the set.
Participation criterion
The participation criterion is a voting system criterion. Voting systems that fail the participation criterion are said to exhibit the no show paradox and allow a particularly unusual strategy of tactical voting: abstaining from an election can help a voter's preferred choice win. The criterion has been defined as follows: In a deterministic framework, the participation criterion says that the addition of a ballot, where candidate A is strictly preferred to candidate B, to an existing tally of votes should not change the winner from candidate A to candidate B.
Monotonicity criterion
The monotonicity criterion is a voting system criterion used to evaluate both single and multiple winner ranked voting systems. A ranked voting system is monotonic if it is neither possible to prevent the election of a candidate by ranking them higher on some of the ballots, nor possible to elect an otherwise unelected candidate by ranking them lower on some of the ballots (while nothing else is altered on any ballot). That is to say, in single winner elections no winner is harmed by up-ranking and no loser is helped by down-ranking.
Majority loser criterion
The majority loser criterion is a criterion to evaluate single-winner voting systems. The criterion states that if a majority of voters prefers every other candidate over a given candidate, then that candidate must not win. Either of the Condorcet loser criterion or the mutual majority criterion implies the majority loser criterion. However, the Condorcet criterion does not imply the majority loser criterion, since the minimax method satisfies the Condorcet but not the majority loser criterion.