Nash and Wardrop Equilibria in Aggregative Games With Coupling Constraints

John Lygeros
2019
Article

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibria. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.

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John Lygeros
2019
Article

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https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/290289?ln=fr

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We study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria for a certain class of aggregative games with finite and possibly large number of players. Sufficient conditions for these are obtained using the theory of variational inequalities together with the specific structure of the objective functions. We further present an algorithm that converges to the Nash equilibrium in a decentralized fashion with provable guarantees. The theoretical results are applied to the problem of managing the charging of a large fleet of plug-in electric vehicles and the results are compared with the existing work.

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