Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense. Whereas choice theory is concerned with individuals making choices based on their preferences, social choice theory is concerned with how to translate the preferences of individuals into the preferences of a group. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Another example is voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences.
Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and public choice theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual members of society. Using elements of formal logic for generality, analysis proceeds from a set of seemingly reasonable axioms of social choice to form a social welfare function (or constitution). Results uncovered the logical incompatibility of various axioms, as in Arrow's theorem, revealing an aggregation problem and suggesting reformulation or theoretical triage in dropping some axiom(s).
Public choice
"Public choice" and "social choice" are heavily overlapping fields of endeavor.
Social choice and public choice theory may overlap but are disjoint if narrowly construed. The Journal of Economic Literature classification codes place Social Choice under Microeconomics at JEL D71 (with Clubs, Committees, and Associations) whereas most Public Choice subcategories are in JEL D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).
Social choice theory (and public choice theory) dates from Condorcet's formulation of the voting paradox, though it arguably goes back further to Ramon Llull's 1299 publication.
Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) and Arrow's impossibility theorem are often acknowledged as the basis of the modern social choice theory and public choice theory.
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An electoral system or voting system is a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums are conducted and how their results are determined. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections may take place in business, non-profit organisations and informal organisations. These rules govern all aspects of the voting process: when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who can stand as a candidate, how ballots are marked and cast, how the ballots are counted, how votes translate into the election outcome, limits on campaign spending, and other factors that can affect the result.
The Condorcet paradox (also known as the voting paradox or the paradox of voting) in social choice theory is a situation noted by the Marquis de Condorcet in the late 18th century, in which collective preferences can be cyclic, even if the preferences of individual voters are not cyclic. This is paradoxical, because it means that majority wishes can be in conflict with each other: Suppose majorities prefer, for example, candidate A over B, B over C, and yet C over A.
Public choice, or public choice theory, is "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science". Its content includes the study of political behavior. In political science, it is the subset of positive political theory that studies self-interested agents (voters, politicians, bureaucrats) and their interactions, which can be represented in a number of ways – using (for example) standard constrained utility maximization, game theory, or decision theory.
Discrete choice models are used extensively in many disciplines where it is important to predict human behavior at a disaggregate level. This course is a follow up of the online course “Introduction t
Discrete choice models are used extensively in many disciplines where it is important to predict human behavior at a disaggregate level. This course is a follow up of the online course “Introduction t
Discrete choice models allow for the analysis and prediction of individuals' choice behavior. The objective of the course is to introduce both methodological and applied aspects, in the field of marke
Le Projet de Master, d'une durée d'un semestre, est un projet d'architecture mené par l'étudiant·e de manière autonome. Il·elle choisit lui·elle-même les membres du groupe de suivi, la thématique et l
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