EquiconsistencyIn mathematical logic, two theories are equiconsistent if the consistency of one theory implies the consistency of the other theory, and vice versa. In this case, they are, roughly speaking, "as consistent as each other". In general, it is not possible to prove the absolute consistency of a theory T. Instead we usually take a theory S, believed to be consistent, and try to prove the weaker statement that if S is consistent then T must also be consistent—if we can do this we say that T is consistent relative to S.
FinitismFinitism is a philosophy of mathematics that accepts the existence only of finite mathematical objects. It is best understood in comparison to the mainstream philosophy of mathematics where infinite mathematical objects (e.g., infinite sets) are accepted as legitimate. The main idea of finitistic mathematics is not accepting the existence of infinite objects such as infinite sets. While all natural numbers are accepted as existing, the set of all natural numbers is not considered to exist as a mathematical object.
Hilbert's problemsHilbert's problems are 23 problems in mathematics published by German mathematician David Hilbert in 1900. They were all unsolved at the time, and several proved to be very influential for 20th-century mathematics. Hilbert presented ten of the problems (1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, 19, 21, and 22) at the Paris conference of the International Congress of Mathematicians, speaking on August 8 at the Sorbonne. The complete list of 23 problems was published later, in English translation in 1902 by Mary Frances Winston Newson in the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society.
Second-order logicIn logic and mathematics, second-order logic is an extension of first-order logic, which itself is an extension of propositional logic. Second-order logic is in turn extended by higher-order logic and type theory. First-order logic quantifies only variables that range over individuals (elements of the domain of discourse); second-order logic, in addition, also quantifies over relations. For example, the second-order sentence says that for every formula P, and every individual x, either Px is true or not(Px) is true (this is the law of excluded middle).
Cut-elimination theoremThe cut-elimination theorem (or Gentzen's Hauptsatz) is the central result establishing the significance of the sequent calculus. It was originally proved by Gerhard Gentzen in his landmark 1934 paper "Investigations in Logical Deduction" for the systems LJ and LK formalising intuitionistic and classical logic respectively. The cut-elimination theorem states that any judgement that possesses a proof in the sequent calculus making use of the cut rule also possesses a cut-free proof, that is, a proof that does not make use of the cut rule.
Primitive recursive arithmeticPrimitive recursive arithmetic (PRA) is a quantifier-free formalization of the natural numbers. It was first proposed by Norwegian mathematician , as a formalization of his finitistic conception of the foundations of arithmetic, and it is widely agreed that all reasoning of PRA is finitistic. Many also believe that all of finitism is captured by PRA, but others believe finitism can be extended to forms of recursion beyond primitive recursion, up to ε0, which is the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic.
ConsistencyIn classical deductive logic, a consistent theory is one that does not lead to a logical contradiction. The lack of contradiction can be defined in either semantic or syntactic terms. The semantic definition states that a theory is consistent if it has a model, i.e., there exists an interpretation under which all formulas in the theory are true. This is the sense used in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term satisfiable is used instead.
Gödel's incompleteness theoremsGödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that are concerned with the limits of in formal axiomatic theories. These results, published by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The theorems are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible. The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.
Peano axiomsIn mathematical logic, the Peano axioms, also known as the Dedekind–Peano axioms or the Peano postulates, are axioms for the natural numbers presented by the 19th-century Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano. These axioms have been used nearly unchanged in a number of metamathematical investigations, including research into fundamental questions of whether number theory is consistent and complete.
