Logique de la prouvabilitéProvability logic is a modal logic, in which the box (or "necessity") operator is interpreted as 'it is provable that'. The point is to capture the notion of a proof predicate of a reasonably rich formal theory, such as Peano arithmetic. There are a number of provability logics, some of which are covered in the literature mentioned in . The basic system is generally referred to as GL (for Gödel–Löb) or L or K4W (W stands for well-foundedness). It can be obtained by adding the modal version of Löb's theorem to the logic K (or K4).
InterpretabilityIn mathematical logic, interpretability is a relation between formal theories that expresses the possibility of interpreting or translating one into the other. Assume T and S are formal theories. Slightly simplified, T is said to be interpretable in S if and only if the language of T can be translated into the language of S in such a way that S proves the translation of every theorem of T. Of course, there are some natural conditions on admissible translations here, such as the necessity for a translation to preserve the logical structure of formulas.
Multimodal logicA multimodal logic is a modal logic that has more than one primitive modal operator. They find substantial applications in theoretical computer science. A modal logic with n primitive unary modal operators is called an n-modal logic. Given these operators and negation, one can always add modal operators defined as if and only if . Perhaps the first substantive example of a two-modal logic is Arthur Prior's tense logic, with two modalities, F and P, corresponding to "sometime in the future" and "sometime in the past".
Logique déontiquevignette|"Justicia", Giotto di Bondone (1267-1337), Capilla Scrovegni, Padoue, Italie. La logique déontique (du grec déon, déontos : devoir, ce qu'il faut, ce qui convient) tente de formaliser les rapports qui existent entre les quatre caractéristiques d'une loi : l'obligation, l'interdiction, la permission et le facultatif. Gottfried Wilheim Leibniz en 1670 proposa le premier d'appliquer la logique modale à la morale en remarquant l'analogie suivante : .
