Aléa moral

Résumé

L’aléa moral (ou moral hazard en anglais) décrit une situation d’asymétrie d'information où un parti n'observe pas parfaitement les actions entreprises par l'autre parti. Un effet pervers qui peut apparaître dans ce type de situations est qu'un agent, isolé d'un risque, se comporte autrement que s'il était totalement lui-même exposé au risque. La théorie des contrats et la théorie des incitations étudient cette asymétrie d'information dans les relations entre agents économiques. Les exemples d'aléa moral sont extrêmement nombreux ; il est difficile d'imaginer une relation économique qui ne soit pas affectée par ce problème. Éléments de définition Pour Adam Smith, c'est ; par extension dans le cadre d'une contractualisation, on appelle aussi aléa moral toute modification du comportement d'un cocontractant contraire à l'intérêt général ou aux intérêts des autres parties au contrat, par rapport à la situation qui prévalait avant la conclusion du contrat (dégradation du tra

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al%C3%A9a_moral

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We challenge the view that short-term debt curbs moral hazard and demonstrate that, in a world with financing frictions and fair debt pricing, short-term debt generates incentives for risk-taking. To do so, we develop a model in which firms are financed with equity and short-term debt and cannot freely optimize their default decision because of financing frictions. We show that when firms are close to distress, the dynamic interaction of operating and rollover losses fuels default risk. In such instances, shareholders find it optimal to increase asset risk to improve interim debt repricing and prevent inefficient liquidation. These risk-taking incentives do not arise when debt maturity is sufficiently long. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA2020

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Collaborative Housing and the Intermediation of Moral Hazard

Thomas Alois Weber

This paper considers intermediation in a di_erentiated short-term housing market where heterogeneous agents may stay at a hotel or at one of several private hosts' properties, below or above hotel quality. The collaborative-housing market fails when agents' hidden actions are noncontractable. If expected liability is not excessive, a trusted intermediary can induce agents to exert first-best effort and fully insure the hosts' risks, without subsidizing the transactions. The intermediary can also extract the hosts' surplus if their outside option is zero; somewhat counter-intuitively, the commission on either side of the transactions does not affect agents' equilibrium payoffs. The optimal commission structure makes direct transactions between hosts and renters unattractive.

EPFL CDM MTEI2013

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Intermediation in a Sharing Economy: Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Rent Extraction

Thomas Alois Weber

Electronic intermediaries have become pervasive in sales transactions for many durables, such as cars, power tools, and apartments. Yet only recently have they successfully tackled the challenge of enabling parties to share such goods. A key impediment to sharing is a lender’s concern about damage due to unobservable actions by a renter, usually resulting in moral hazard. This paper shows how an intermediary can eliminate the moral-hazard problem by providing optimal insurance to the lender and first-best-incentives to the renter to exert care, as long as market participants are risk-neutral. The solution is illustrated for the collaborative housing market but applies in principle to any sharing market with vertically differentiated goods. A population of renters, heterogeneous both in their preferences for housing quality and with respect to the amounts of care they exert in a rental situation, faces a choice between collaborative housing and staying at a local hotel. The private hosts choose their prices strategically and the intermediary sets commission rates on both sides of the market as well as insurance terms for the rental agreement. The latter are set so as to eliminate moral hazard. The intermediary is able to extract the gains the hosts would earn compared to transacting directly. Finally, even if hotels set their prices at the outset so as to maximize collusive profits, we find that collaborative housing persists at substantial market shares, regardless of the difference between the efficiencies of hosts and hotels to reduce renters’ cost of effort. The aggregate of hosts, intermediary, and hotels benefits from a variety in these effort costs, which indicates that the intermediated sharing of goods is an economically viable, robust phenomenon.

Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd2014

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