Peine de mort

upright=1.5|vignette|Application de la peine de mort dans le monde en 2021. La peine de mort, ou peine capitale, est une peine prévue par la loi consistant à exécuter une personne ayant été reconnue coupable d'une faute qualifiée de « crime capital ». La sentence est prononcée par le pouvoir judiciaire à l'issue d'un procès. En l'absence d'un procès, ou dans les cas où celui-ci n'est pas réalisé par une institution reconnue, on parle d'exécution sommaire, d'acte de vengeance ou de justice privée. La peine de mort est diversement considérée selon les époques et les régions géographiques. Parmi les 197 pays du globe, la peine de mort est prévue dans les textes de loi de 82 pays, et 23 d'entre eux ont procédé à des exécutions en 2014. En 2022, 145 pays sont abolitionnistes, dont 113 pour tous les crimes. La peine de mort est une sanction reconnue bien que réprouvée par les institutions internationales comme l'Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) ou la Cour européenne des droits de

Essays in Banking and Financial Regulation

Susanne Johanna Petronella Léonie Vissers

This thesis examines how banks choose their optimal capital structure and cash reserves in the presence of regulatory measures. The first chapter, titled Bank Capital Structure and Tail Risk, presents a bank capital structure model in which bank assets are subject to both diffusion and tail risk. Of these two types of risk, tail risk causes uninsured deposits to be risky, as the bank's asset value can unexpectedly fall below the value of deposits in case of default. The model shows that tail risk, rather than diffusion risk, is the main driver of the risk on deposits when the bank is unregulated and of the endogenous deposit insurance premium when the bank is regulated. Keeping total volatility constant, the model shows that a high tail risk component leads to higher credit spreads, default risk, and magnitude of bank losses in default than a high diffusion risk component.The second chapter, titled Bank Regulation and Market Discipline in the Presence of Risk-Taking Incentives, presents a bank capital structure model in which equity holders can increase asset risk once debt is in place. I study the effects of capital requirements and subsidized deposit insurance on the bank's privately optimal funding and operational risk level. The model predicts that there are synergetic effects of regulation and market discipline. When the regulator sets the capital charge and deposit insurance premium payments sufficiently high for a risky portfolio, the bank commits to the low-risk asset portfolio by setting a lower leverage ratio and substituting market debt for deposits. This market discipline effect disappears when the regulatory costs become too high. In the third chapter that is titled Dividend Restrictions and Asymmetric Information, we develop a dynamic model of a bank whose management has superior information about the impact of a pending shock to the bank's cash holdings and can signal the bank's type through its dividend policy. Banks that will be adversely affected by the shock have incentives to pool with unaffected banks to increase their market value. To avoid being mimicked, the unaffected banks can credibly signal via a more aggressive payout strategy. Dividend payout restrictions have the potential to prevent a separating equilibrium from forming. This leads to the bad type adopting a more aggressive payout policy with a higher risk of default but mitigates the distortion of the good type's policy. We identify a number of scenarios where this trade-off presents an opportunity for regulatory intervention and some where it does not.

EPFL2021

Robust Dynamically Deployed Static Analysis for Java

Sebastian Gfeller

Guaranteeing the absence of errors in a program is a great challenge and many static analysis techniques have been developed to see whether a program is correct before we run it. There is, however, a whole class of programs that are especially difficult to analyze in this manner. These programs have a very different behavior that depends on configuration files, command line parameters and user input. Also, they are long running. For such programs, there are advantages to dynamically deployed analyses that can tell us after the program has been run for some time whether crashes are still possible in its future execution. In this thesis, we see how to combine current program state with static analysis techniques to predict absence of errors in the future. We show how, if a program can not yet be guaranteed to run correctly, we can make future checks more efficient. The thesis also explores how the analysis can run in parallel with program execution without slowing down execution too much. The techniques that are explored are implemented as an extension for the Java PathFinder Java Virtual Machine.

2009

Essays in Banking and Financial Regulation

Susanne Johanna Petronella Léonie Vissers

EPFL2021

Essays in Banking and Financial Regulation

Robust Dynamically Deployed Static Analysis for Java

The Program Decision Logic Approach to Predicated Execution

Essays in Banking and Financial Regulation

Robust Dynamically Deployed Static Analysis for Java

The Program Decision Logic Approach to Predicated Execution