Proof calculusIn mathematical logic, a proof calculus or a proof system is built to prove statements. A proof system includes the components: Language: The set L of formulas admitted by the system, for example, propositional logic or first-order logic. Rules of inference: List of rules that can be employed to prove theorems from axioms and theorems. Axioms: Formulas in L assumed to be valid. All theorems are derived from axioms. Usually a given proof calculus encompasses more than a single particular formal system, since many proof calculi are under-determined and can be used for radically different logics.
Ordinal analysisIn proof theory, ordinal analysis assigns ordinals (often large countable ordinals) to mathematical theories as a measure of their strength. If theories have the same proof-theoretic ordinal they are often equiconsistent, and if one theory has a larger proof-theoretic ordinal than another it can often prove the consistency of the second theory. The field of ordinal analysis was formed when Gerhard Gentzen in 1934 used cut elimination to prove, in modern terms, that the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic is ε0.
Diagonal lemmaIn mathematical logic, the diagonal lemma (also known as diagonalization lemma, self-reference lemma or fixed point theorem) establishes the existence of self-referential sentences in certain formal theories of the natural numbers—specifically those theories that are strong enough to represent all computable functions. The sentences whose existence is secured by the diagonal lemma can then, in turn, be used to prove fundamental limitative results such as Gödel's incompleteness theorems and Tarski's undefinability theorem.
Théorie oméga-cohérenteEn logique mathématique une théorie arithmétique est appelée théorie ω-cohérente (oméga-cohérente) quand, pour toute propriété P des nombres entiers que l'on peut exprimer dans le langage de la théorie, si pour chaque entier n, P(n) est démontrable dans la théorie, alors ¬∀x P(x) n'est pas démontrable dans la théorie (¬ pour la négation, ∀ pour la quantification universelle, « pour tout »). Quand on prend pour P un énoncé clos (qui ne dépend pas de x) on retrouve la définition de la cohérence, appelée parfois dans ce contexte cohérence simple, qui est donc conséquence de l'ω-cohérence.
Programme de HilbertLe programme de Hilbert est un programme créé par David Hilbert dans le but d'assurer les fondements des mathématiques. Les conceptions scientifiques de David Hilbert ont une grande influence sur les mathématiciens de son époque. Hilbert s'oppose fermement au pessimisme scientifique prôné en particulier par le physiologiste Emil du Bois-Reymond, pour qui il est des questions en sciences qui resteront toujours sans réponse, une doctrine connue sous le nom d'« Ignorabimus » (du latin ignoramus et ignorabimus : « Nous ne savons pas et nous ne saurons jamais »).
SequentIn mathematical logic, a sequent is a very general kind of conditional assertion. A sequent may have any number m of condition formulas Ai (called "antecedents") and any number n of asserted formulas Bj (called "succedents" or "consequents"). A sequent is understood to mean that if all of the antecedent conditions are true, then at least one of the consequent formulas is true. This style of conditional assertion is almost always associated with the conceptual framework of sequent calculus.
Primitive recursive arithmeticPrimitive recursive arithmetic (PRA) is a quantifier-free formalization of the natural numbers. It was first proposed by Norwegian mathematician , as a formalization of his finitistic conception of the foundations of arithmetic, and it is widely agreed that all reasoning of PRA is finitistic. Many also believe that all of finitism is captured by PRA, but others believe finitism can be extended to forms of recursion beyond primitive recursion, up to ε0, which is the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic.
Dialectica interpretationIn proof theory, the Dialectica interpretation is a proof interpretation of intuitionistic logic (Heyting arithmetic) into a finite type extension of primitive recursive arithmetic, the so-called System T. It was developed by Kurt Gödel to provide a consistency proof of arithmetic. The name of the interpretation comes from the journal Dialectica, where Gödel's paper was published in a 1958 special issue dedicated to Paul Bernays on his 70th birthday.
Formule atomiqueEn logique mathématique, une formule atomique ou atome est une formule qui ne contient pas de sous-formules propres. La structure d'une formule atomique dépend de la logique considérée, p. ex. en logique des propositions, les formules atomiques sont les variables propositionnelles. Les atomes sont les formules les plus simples dans un système logique et servent à construire les formules les plus générales.
Structural ruleIn proof theory, a structural rule is an inference rule that does not refer to any logical connective, but instead operates on the judgment or sequents directly. Structural rules often mimic intended meta-theoretic properties of the logic. Logics that deny one or more of the structural rules are classified as substructural logics. Three common structural rules are: Weakening, where the hypotheses or conclusion of a sequent may be extended with additional members.
