Passive nuclear safety is a design approach for safety features, implemented in a nuclear reactor, that does not require any active intervention on the part of the operator or electrical/electronic feedback in order to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown state, in the event of a particular type of emergency (usually overheating resulting from a loss of coolant or loss of coolant flow). Such design features tend to rely on the engineering of components such that their predicted behaviour would slow down, rather than accelerate the deterioration of the reactor state; they typically take advantage of natural forces or phenomena such as gravity, buoyancy, pressure differences, conduction or natural heat convection to accomplish safety functions without requiring an active power source. Many older common reactor designs use passive safety systems to a limited extent, rather, relying on active safety systems such as diesel powered motors. Some newer reactor designs feature more passive systems; the motivation being that they are highly reliable and reduce the cost associated with the installation and maintenance of systems that would otherwise require multiple trains of equipment and redundant safety class power supplies in order to achieve the same level of reliability. However, weak driving forces that power many passive safety features can pose significant challenges to effectiveness of a passive system, particularly in the short term following an accident.
'Passive safety' describes any safety mechanisms the engagement of which requires little or no outside power or human control. Modern reactor designs have focused on increasing the number of passive systems to mitigate risk of compounding human error.
Despite the increased safety associated with greater coverage by passive systems, all current large-scale nuclear reactors require both external (active) and internal (passive) systems. There are no 'passively safe' reactors, only systems and components.
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Passive nuclear safety is a design approach for safety features, implemented in a nuclear reactor, that does not require any active intervention on the part of the operator or electrical/electronic feedback in order to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown state, in the event of a particular type of emergency (usually overheating resulting from a loss of coolant or loss of coolant flow).
Generation IV reactors (Gen IV) are nuclear reactor design technologies that are envisioned as successors of generation III reactors. The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) - an international organization that coordinates the development of generation IV reactors - specifically selected six reactor technologies as candidates for generation IV reactors. The designs target improved safety, sustainability, efficiency, and cost.
Le réacteur nucléaire à sels fondus (RSF ; molten salt reactor, MSR) est un concept de réacteur nucléaire dans lequel le combustible nucléaire se présente sous forme liquide, dissous dans du sel fondu (à ) qui joue à la fois le rôle de caloporteur et de barrière de confinement. Le réacteur peut être modéré par du graphite (produisant des neutrons thermiques) ou sans modérateur (neutrons rapides). Le concept a été étudié en laboratoire pendant les années 1960, puis délaissé dans les années 1970 faute de financement et malgré des résultats probants.
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