Secret commercial

Résumé

Le secret commercial, proche ou équivalent francophone du « trade secret » des anglophones, est défini comme . En droit français et européen, le secret des affaires ou le secret d'affaires se sont récemment substitués au secret commercial. Il peut englober le secret industriel et n'est pas nécessairement associé à la notion de propriété commerciale ou de propriété industrielle, lesquelles offrent des droits privatifs (en échange de redevance), alors que le « régime du secret » ne confère en tant que tel aucun droit de propriété à son détenteur. Parfois (au Canada par exemple), l'expression secret commercial peut être assimilée à celle de secret industriel. La recherche des secrets d'entreprises concurrentes n’est pas fautive en elle-même, elle ne le devient que lorsque des moyens déloyaux sont utilisés. Caractéristiques Le secret des affaires n'a de sens que quand l'information associée à l'élément devant rester « secret » a une valeur réelle (actuel

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_commercial

À propos de ce résultat

Cette page est générée automatiquement et peut contenir des informations qui ne sont pas correctes, complètes, à jour ou pertinentes par rapport à votre recherche. Il en va de même pour toutes les autres pages de ce site. Veillez à vérifier les informations auprès des sources officielles de l'EPFL.

Publications associées (3)

Publications associées

Chargement

Personnes associées

Aucun résultat

Personnes associées

Chargement

Unités associées

Chargement

Concepts associés (16)

Concepts associés

Chargement

Cours associés (13)

Cours associés

Chargement

Séances de cours associées (25)

Séances de cours associées

Chargement

, ,

Embedded cryptographic systems, such as smart cards, require secure implementations that are robust to a variety of low-level attacks. Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) exploit the information such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation and acoustic leaking through the device to uncover the secret information. Attackers can mount successful attacks with very modest resources in a short time period. Therefore, many methods have been proposed to increase the security against SCA. Randomizing the execution order of the instructions that are independent, i.e., random shuffling, is one of the most popular among them. Implementing instruction shuffling in software is either implementation specific or has a significant performance or code size overhead. To overcome these problems, we propose in this work a generic custom hardware unit to implement random instruction shuffling as an extension to existing processors. The unit operates between the CPU and the instruction cache (or memory, if no cache exists), without any modification to these components. Both true and pseudo random number generators are used to dynamically and locally provide the shuffling sequence. The unit is mainly designed for in-order processors, since the embedded devices subject to these kind of attacks use simple in-order processors. More advanced processors (e.g., superscalar, VLIW or EPIC processors) are already more resistant to these attacks because of their built-in ILP and wide word size. Our experiments on two different soft in-order processor cores, i.e., OpenRISC and MicroBlaze, implemented on FPGA show that the proposed unit could increase the security drastically with very modest resource overhead. With around 2% area, 1.5% power and no performance overhead, the shuffler increases the effort to mount a successful power analysis attack on AES software implementation over 360 times.

2012

Chargement

A First Step Towards Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures

Ali Galip Bayrak, Philip Brisk, Paolo Ienne, Francesco Regazzoni

In cryptography, side channel attacks, such as power analysis, attempt to uncover secret information from the physical implementation of cryptosystems rather than exploiting weaknesses in the cryptographic algorithms themselves. The design and implementation of physically secure cryptosystems is a challenge for both hardware and software designers. Measuring and evaluating the security of a system is manual and empirical, which is costly and time consuming; this work demonstrates that it is possible to automate these processes. We introduce a systematic methodology for automatic application of software countermeasures and demonstrate its effectiveness on an AES software implementation running on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller. The framework identifies the most vulnerable instructions of the implementation to power analysis attacks, and then transforms the software using a chosen countermeasure to protect the vulnerable instructions. Lastly, it evaluates the security of the system using an information-theoretic metric and a direct attack.

Acm Order Department, P O Box 64145, Baltimore, Md 21264 Usa2011

Chargement

, , ,

Mobile users are increasing fast in numbers, new types of services and applications become available, and new mobile systems (e.g., for intelligent transportation) emerge. Meanwhile, the need for securing communication in such large scale, highly dynamic systems grows. But the organizational complexity and operational costs make traditional security solutions hard to deploy at the rate new mobile applications are rolled out. The challenge that lies ahead is how to provide versatile security compatible with the large deployed mobile networking infrastructure. We propose a novel approach to establish cryptographic keys. Our basic observation is that users are often very mobile and, as they interact with the infrastructure, each of them can leave a unique trace behind. Unlike many works that seek to identify structure in the mobility of a population, we leverage the inherent randomness of the mobility of individuals (and thus the randomness of mobile-infrastructure interactions) to establish shared secret keys between each mobile node and the infrastructure. With an underlying readily available source of uncertainty, such keys can be generated as needed, on the fly, to enhance the system and user security in many ways. We find that with no or little change to existing mobile communication systems, users can generate a common secret with the infrastructure at a rate of roughly

0.1

bits per second.

2010

Chargement

, , ,

0.1

bits per second.

2010