Publications associées à Enchère

Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mechanism for selling multiple items to multiple anonymous bidders with additive values. The seller knows that the bidders' values range over a box uncertainty ...

2024

Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design

Cagil Kocyigit

Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...

EPFL2020

Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design

Daniel Kuhn, Cagil Kocyigit, Wolfram Wiesemann

We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for each of whom it has a private value that is unknown to the seller and the other bidders. The agents perceive the ensemble of all bidder values as a random v ...

2020

A Truthful, Privacy-Preserving, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auction For Single-minded Bidders

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar, Sankarshan Damle

Combinatorial auctions are widely used to sell resources/items. The challenges in such auctions are multi-fold. We need to ensure that bidders, the strategic agents, bid their valuations truthfully to the auction mechanism. Besides, the agents may desire p ...

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2019

Distributed Multi-Unit Privacy Assured Bidding (PAB) for Smart Grid Demand Response Programs

Muhammed Fatih Balli

The stringent requirement of the demand-supply equilibrium for delivering electricity has traditionally been dealt with a supply-side perspective, assuming that the demand is not alterable. With the promises of the Smart Grid, demand- side management techn ...

2018

Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar

Crowdsourcing marketplaces link large populations of workers to an even larger number of tasks. Thus, it is necessary to have mechanisms for matching workers with interesting and suitable tasks. Earlier work has addressed the problem of finding optimal wor ...

Springer International Publishing Ag2017

Revenue and Reserve Prices in a Probabilistic Single Item Auction

Moran Feldman

We investigate the effect of limiting the number of reserve prices on the revenue in a probabilistic single item auction. In the model considered, bidders compete for an impression drawn from a known distribution of possible types. The auction mechanism se ...

Springer Verlag2017

Online Auctions for Dynamic Assignment: Theory and Empirical Evaluation

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar

Dynamic resource assignment is a common problem in multi-agent systems. We consider scenarios in which dynamic agents have preferences about assignments and the resources that can be assigned using online auctions. We study the trade-off between the follow ...

Ios Press2016

Estimation of bid functions for location choice and price modeling with a latent variable approach

Michel Bierlaire, Ricardo Daniel Hurtubia González

A new approach for the estimation of bid-rent functions for residential location choice is proposed. The method is based on the bid-auction approach and considers that the expected maximum bid of the auction is a latent variable that can be related to obse ...

Springer2014

Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions

Laura Elisa Celis

Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can ...

Informs2014