We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mechanism for selling multiple items to multiple anonymous bidders with additive values. The seller knows that the bidders' values range over a box uncertainty ...
Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...
Combinatorial auctions are widely used to sell resources/items. The challenges in such auctions are multi-fold. We need to ensure that bidders, the strategic agents, bid their valuations truthfully to the auction mechanism. Besides, the agents may desire p ...
Crowdsourcing marketplaces link large populations of workers to an even larger number of tasks. Thus, it is necessary to have mechanisms for matching workers with interesting and suitable tasks. Earlier work has addressed the problem of finding optimal wor ...
Dynamic resource assignment is a common problem in multi-agent systems. We consider scenarios in which dynamic agents have preferences about assignments and the resources that can be assigned using online auctions. We study the trade-off between the follow ...
A new approach for the estimation of bid-rent functions for residential location choice is proposed. The method is based on the bid-auction approach and considers that the expected maximum bid of the auction is a latent variable that can be related to obse ...
This thesis describes the development of three conceptual models built to serve as decision support tools in liberalised electricity markets. The introduction of competition, higher uncertainty and decentralised planning requires new planning and analysis ...
Models of computational trust support users in taking decisions. They are commonly used to guide users' judgements in online auction sites; or to determine quality of contributions in Web 2.0 sites. However, most existing systems require historical informa ...
We present a cryptographically t-private protocol for electronic auctions whose low resource demands make it viable for practical use. Our construction is based on Yao's garbled circuits and pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs). Our protocol involves a f ...
